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THE LAW OF INTIMATE WORK 
Naomi Schoenbaum* 
Abstract: This Article introduces the concept of intimate work—intimate services 
provided by paid workers to a range of consumers—and seeks to unify its treatment in law. 
The concept explains multiple exceptions to work law that have previously been viewed as 
random and even contradictory. From the daycare worker to the divorce lawyer, the nurse to 
the hairstylist, intimate work introduces an intimate party—the consumer—into the arm’s-
length employer-employee dyad on which work law is premised. This disruption leads to 
limited enforcement of non-compete agreements, the waiver or imposition of fiduciary duties, 
and exceptions to wage-and-hour and antidiscrimination law, among other consequences. 
The current ad hoc approach to intimate work does harm. Law’s separate regulation of 
intimacy and work fails to recognize the special value and vulnerability generated when the 
two overlap. At times, law protects only a narrow subset of intimate work, as the existing 
approach to non-compete agreements reveals. At other times, law gets intimate work 
backward, taking away protection at precisely the moment more protection is needed, as is 
the case with antidiscrimination law. The resulting law permits employers to promote 
discrimination in the formation of intimate work bonds, to discipline intimate workers who 
act to benefit consumers, to expose intimate workers and consumers to the abuse of personal 
information, and to break valuable intimate work bonds with impunity. These harms are only 
magnified with the rise of intimate work. 
This Article proposes a unified law of intimate work sensitive to the value and 
vulnerability it generates. This law has implications for a wide swath of doctrines, and for 
gender equality, as women are especially harmed by the failure to value intimate work. Much 
of this law can be achieved by analogical adaptation of time-proven doctrines. For example, 
law should no longer ignore lost intimate work bonds as an injury when evaluating non-
compete agreements or crafting remedies for termination. In other situations, new approaches 
are needed, such as limits on employers’ ability to cultivate discriminatory consumer 
preferences. In the end, this new law of intimate work is designed to protect intimate workers 
and consumers while valuing relationships that are central to everyday life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following cases. A hospital seeking to hire a labor and 
delivery nurse may consider only women for the position, although such 
discrimination would be unlawful in hiring almost all other workers.
1
 A 
home health aide hired to provide companionship to an elderly client 
need not be paid minimum wage or overtime, although an employer 
would violate wage-and-hour law by failing to pay almost any other 
worker.
2
 A lawyer or therapist owes fiduciary obligations to her clients, 
although most other workers are held only to arm’s-length contractual 
obligations to their clients.
3
 A non-compete agreement restricting a 
doctor from ongoing relationships with patients is unenforceable, 
although a court would not hesitate to enforce the same agreement as 
applied to an accountant, a hairstylist, or most any other worker.
4
 
This Article explains and unifies these exceptional cases by 
introducing the concept of intimate work. Intimate work involves the 
paid provision of services entailing intimacy to a range of consumers. 
The examples above reveal that law often singles out intimate work for 
special treatment, creating a de facto law of intimate work. To appreciate 
the breadth of this phenomenon, one need look no further than two of the 
most watched Supreme Court cases last term. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.’s5 recognition of employers’ religious freedom may lead to 
special treatment for intimate work under antidiscrimination law, 
permitting wedding vendors, for example, to refuse service to gay 
couples.
6
 And Harris v. Quinn’s7 holding that home healthcare providers 
are the lone public employees exempt from union dues sets intimate 
                                                 
1. See Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 
F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (dismissing case on mootness grounds because the plaintiff found work 
with another employer, which mooted all of his requested relief).  
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2012) (exempting workers who provide companionship to the 
elderly from wage-and-hour protections). In 2013, the Department of Labor issued regulations that 
would narrow this exemption. The D.C. Circuit reversed the invalidation of both rules, but it is too 
soon to tell whether any further review will unsettle this outcome. See infra note 181 for further 
discussion of these rules. 
3. See, e.g., Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829–30 (Ala. 1973) (applying fiduciary duties to 
doctor vis-à-vis patient); Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(applying fiduciary duties to attorney vis-à-vis client). 
4. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (invalidating 
non-compete agreement for interfering with the doctor-patient relationship); Williams v. Hobbs, 460 
N.E.2d 287, 290 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (same). 
5. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Hobby Lobby Is Only the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2014, at A25.  
7. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
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work apart under labor law.
8
 Despite the special place of intimate work 
throughout a range of laws, no scholar has yet synthesized the law of 
intimate work or assessed its effectiveness.
9
 
By developing the category of intimate work as a descriptive matter, 
this Article brings the unique features of intimate work, and its current 
regulation, into full view. Normatively, the Article reveals the 
incoherence of the existing law of intimate work. Across a wide swath of 
doctrines—from antidiscrimination law, to wage-and-hour law, to 
retaliation protections, to fiduciary law, to non-compete agreements, to 
the misappropriation of trade secrets, to remedies for unlawful 
termination—law has not done enough to recognize the unique 
circumstances of intimate work. This Article argues for a new unified 
field of intimate work law to protect the circumstances under which 
intimate workers labor and the public as consumers receive critical 
services. 
Bringing together intimacy and work joins two spheres that law tends 
to consider separate.
10
 Yet, in everyday life, intimacy and work are 
anything but distinct. Workers—doctors, nurses, divorce lawyers, 
hairstylists, and bartenders—have long engaged in the intimate aspects 
of life. More recently, intimate work is on the rise, as workers have come 
to provide services that were once the hallmark of family life.
11
 Dating 
counselors guide us in how to pick the right partners; wedding planners 
instruct us in how to create memories; lactation consultants teach us how 
to breastfeed; and funeral directors arrange our deaths.
12
 It is now 
possible to rent a worker to serve as a mom, husband, grandma, grandpa, 
or friend.
13
 
                                                 
8. Id. at 2644. 
9. Scholars have addressed individual examples of intimate work, but have not explored the 
category as a unified field in experience or law. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72–79 (1996) (discussing work law exceptions for domestic care workers); 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex 
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 156 (2004) (discussing the bona fide occupational 
qualification to antidiscrimination law as applied to some intimate work). 
10. See infra Part II.A. 
11. See Timothy Noah, Labor of Love: The Enforced Happiness of Pret A Manger, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112204/pret-manger-when-
corporations-enforce-happiness. 
12. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE OUTSOURCED SELF: INTIMATE LIFE IN MARKET 
TIMES 9–17 (2012). 
13. See, e.g., RENT A MOM INC., http://www.rentamominc.com (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (“The 
Company with a Heart for Families”); RENT A HUSBAND, http://www.rentahusband.com (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2015) (promising a “handyman . . . in a good mood . . . [e]ven if those nagging household 
chores have put you in a bad one”); RENT A GRANDMA, http://rentagrandma.com (last visited Aug. 
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While the varieties of intimate work differ, they are united by the 
presence of a consumer seeking and receiving intimacy. The intimacy 
consumer disrupts the arm’s-length employer-employee dyad that law, in 
contrast to social science, assumes is at the heart of all employment 
relationships.
14
 The close relationship between the worker and consumer 
generates value as a source of personal and professional support for both 
consumers and workers, but also generates substantial vulnerability.
15
 
Together, this value and vulnerability place participants in the intimate 
work relationship in a unique position that calls for tailored regulation. 
But law’s separate regulation of intimacy and work creates a blind spot 
to a social reality—like intimate work—that combines the two. Law thus 
fails to protect the value and guard against the vulnerability of intimate 
work. This legal shortcoming has consequences for the promise of work 
as a site of equality, for the harms that can flow from work, and for the 
stability of critical relationships. 
First, intimate work raises vulnerability to discrimination. The close 
relationships formed by intimate work are valuable as a site for 
combatting bias, but these relationships also introduce another party into 
the employment relationship—the consumer—who can discriminate 
against the worker and against whom the worker can discriminate.
16
 
Rather than using intimate work to promote equality, law exempts 
certain intimate workers from protection.
17
 For other intimate workers 
and consumers, law fails to intervene when employers reinforce 
discriminatory preferences by, for example, accommodating consumers’ 
                                                 
8, 2015); RENT A GRANDPA, http://rentagrandpa.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2015); RENT A FRIEND, 
https://rentafriend.com/beafriend (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (“Get paid to be a friend!”). 
14. Compare Robin Leidner, Emotional Labor in Service Work, 561 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 81 (1999) (highlighting the relationship between the worker and the consumer as critical to 
the work experience), and Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the 
Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 674, 677 (1996) 
(highlighting the relationship between the worker and the consumer as essential to developing trust 
between the consumer and the firm), and Amy S. Wharton, The Sociology of Emotional Labor, 35 
ANN. REV. SOC. 147, 160 (2009) (same), with MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the premise of work law as the employer-employee 
relationship), and MARK ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 3 (7th ed. 2011) (defining the subject of work law as the regulation of the employer-
employee relationship). 
15. See infra Part I.B.2. 
16. See infra Part II.B.  
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in 
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification . . . .”).  
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preferences (e.g., a request for a female gynecologist),
18
 and advertising 
workers’ preferences (e.g., a photographer indicating her opposition to 
gay marriage).
19
 
Second, there is the vulnerability to sacrifice. Intimate workers’ 
willingness to act altruistically on behalf of consumers generates value, 
but also means that they risk work-related rewards—including their 
jobs—to benefit consumers.20 Rather than protecting the value that 
altruism generates, law again takes away protection. Even though 
altruism means intimate workers may do more work for consumers, 
certain intimate workers are exempt from law that guarantees payment 
for these efforts.
21
 And even though intimate workers are more likely to 
risk retaliation by advocating on behalf of consumers, law affords them 
no additional retaliation protection, and in practice provides less.
22
 
Third, there is the vulnerability to exposure. Intimate relationships 
lead to value-generating closeness and sharing, but also leave workers 
and consumers vulnerable to having sensitive information revealed and 
misused, and to emotional harm.
23
 Law recognizes this value and the 
attendant vulnerability too narrowly. Some intimate workers owe 
fiduciary duties to their consumers to protect them from this type of 
exposure.
24
 But more often, these duties do not extend to intimate 
workers,
25
 nor do they run from consumers to intimate workers, even 
though the latter reveal personal information and may be just as exposed. 
No other law protects against the emotional harm to which intimate 
workers and consumers are vulnerable. 
                                                 
18. See Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., No. 98 Civ. 7455, 2000 WL 1400965, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2000) (holding that satisfying patient’s request for female gynecologist does not constitute 
unlawful discrimination). 
19. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that wedding 
photographer who refuses service to gay couple violates antidiscrimination law but stating that 
employer could post a sign indicating its disapproval of same-sex marriage instead). 
20. See infra Part II.C.  
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2012) (exempting babysitters and companions for the elderly 
from overtime and minimum wage); id. § 213(b)(21) (exempting live-in domestic workers from 
overtime).  
22. See, e.g., Five Star Transp., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42 (2007) (refusal to hire school bus drivers 
who complained about safety concerns for children to predecessor employer); Orchard Park Health 
Care Ctr., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 644 (2004) (suspension and discharge of nursing home 
employees who complained about poor client conditions). 
23. See infra Part II.D.  
24. See, e.g., Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (attorney-client); Petrillo v. 
Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (doctor-patient).  
25. See, e.g., Grow v. Ind. Retired Teachers Cmty., 271 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) 
(retirement home worker-resident). 
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
2015] INTIMATE WORK 1173 
 
Finally, there is the vulnerability to lost investments. Despite the 
unique value the intimate relationship produces, workers and consumers 
are vulnerable to losing this value when their relationships rupture.
26
 The 
law of non-compete agreements recognizes the lost value of these 
ruptured relationships for a narrow subset of workers—doctors and 
lawyers—but not for the whole category of intimate work.27 Other law 
that regulates the rupture of intimate work ties—such as the duty of 
loyalty, trade secrets, and unemployment insurance—fails to take 
account of these ruptured relationships, leaving intimate workers and 
their consumers perpetually vulnerable to losing investments in these 
bonds.
28
 
This Article calls for a comprehensive field of intimate work law that 
protects the value and remedies the vulnerability of intimate work. 
Extending critiques of the law’s special treatment of intimacy outside of 
work,
29
 this Article theorizes how a law that recognizes intimate work 
would better reflect and protect the value that intimacy and work bring to 
our lives. A law reconfigured to recognize intimate work would also 
bring significant benefits for gender equality, as women bear the 
disproportionate burden of the failure to value intimate work.
30
 Beyond 
these benefits, law is needed because private ordering is inadequate in 
the intimate work context. 
A new law of intimate work would recognize intimate work in two 
recognize the relevance of intimate work under current doctrine. In 
deciding the enforceability of a non-compete agreement, for example, 
courts must consider hardship to the worker and injury to the public,
31
 
yet courts do not take into account the loss of intimate work 
                                                 
26. See infra Part II.E. 
27. See, e.g., Zona Corp. v. McKinnon, No. PLCV201100247, 2011 WL 1663094 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 14, 2011) (hairstylist); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993) 
(veterinarian).  
28. See infra Part II.E.2–.4. 
29. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (critiquing special discrimination rules for the 
family); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005) 
(critiquing special economic exchange rules for the family); Melissa Murray, The Networked 
Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385 
(2008) (critiquing special support rules for the domestic family); Laura Rosenbury, Friends with 
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (same); Silbaugh, supra note 9 (critiquing special work 
rules for the family). See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of 
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (exposing and critiquing legal 
separation of family and market). 
30. See infra note 290 and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., Hopper, 861 P.2d at 539–40.  
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relationships. Second, this Article proposes additional law to recognize 
intimate work fully. To enhance the free formation of intimate work 
bonds, for example, new law would limit employers’ reliance on identity 
traits to match consumers with intimate workers. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I makes visible the social 
reality of intimate work by defining intimate work, setting forth a 
typology with illustrative examples, and delineating the contours of the 
category. Part II describes the existing law of intimate work and what is 
missing. Relying on a rich social science literature, this Part catalogues 
the mismatch between the law of intimate work and the conduct of 
intimate workers and consumers—and the harms that result. Part III 
theorizes a new law of intimate work that would extend existing legal 
protections to intimate work and develop new protections. 
I.  INTIMATE WORK 
Until the Industrial Revolution, intimacy and work were merged in 
the household: Work was done in the home by the family, which was 
also the primary site of intimacy.
32
 The law likewise merged these 
relations within the status relations of the household: master-wife, 
master-servant, and master-slave.
33
 With the Industrial Revolution came 
a spatial separation of family and work that placed the family (and 
intimacy) in the home, and paid work in the market.
34
 An ideology and 
law of separate spheres followed. The market became the province of 
work, which was marked by rationality, self-interest, and autonomy.
35
 
The family became the province of intimacy, which was marked by 
affection, altruism, and dependence.
36
 The law followed, with separate 
law governing the family and the market.
37
 
This divide is, of course, a false one. Workers regularly engage in 
intimacy,
38
 and, indeed, the primary purpose of some jobs is to provide 
intimate services to consumers.
39
 But it is not the mere ubiquity of 
                                                 
32. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499.  
33. See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8 
(2011). 
34. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499. 
35. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10–43 
(1992); Olsen, supra note 29, at 1563–70. 
36. See Gavison, supra note 35, at 10–43; Olsen, supra note 29, at 1563–70. 
37. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499.  
38. See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 130–34 
(2011). 
39. Consider the psychotherapist, massage therapist, nurse, or divorce lawyer, to name just a few 
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intimate work that matters for legal regulation. It is the common 
consequences of introducing an intimate consumer into work—the 
unique value and vulnerability that it generates—that render it a category 
worthy of special regulation. But law’s focus on the employer-employee 
relationship to the exclusion of the relationship with the consumer means 
that the law fails to protect the value, and guard against the vulnerability, 
that intimate work produces. 
Before turning to the shortcomings of the law’s current approach to 
intimate work, this Part provides an integrated account of the 
phenomenon of intimate work and what coheres it as an important 
category of study for law. It begins by defining intimate work, follows 
with several illustrative examples, and then differentiates the category of 
intimate work from other types of work. 
A. Definition and Typology 
The definition of intimate work set forth earlier—a worker providing 
intimate services to a consumer—requires unpacking. The “intimate” 
part of intimate work arises when interactions depend on “particularized 
knowledge received, and attention provided by, at least one person—
knowledge and attention that are not widely available to third parties.”40 
The knowledge is not ordinary knowledge, but knowledge of special 
types of information such as “shared secrets, interpersonal rituals, bodily 
information, awareness of personal vulnerability, and shared memory of 
embarrassing situations.”41 Nor is the attention ordinary attention, but 
attention that encompasses “such elements as terms of endearment, 
bodily services, private languages, emotional support, and correction of 
embarrassing defects.”42 
The “work” part of intimate work means that these intimate services 
are provided as part of, or adjunct to, paid market work.
43
 Note that this 
definition excludes intimate work in the family. Other scholars have 
recognized the presence of intimate work within the family, primarily in 
the form of housework and childcare.
44
 While intimate work in the 
                                                 
examples.  
40. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 14 (2005). 
41. Id.  
42. Id. at 14–15. 
43. Work can be paid or unpaid, part of the market or not. See Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare 
Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373, 380–83 (2006).  
44. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 11–13; Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 
1574 (1996); Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 
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family shares some features of intimate work in the market, it remains 
unpaid.
45
 
Intimate work arises in four common categories. First, work can be 
intimate because it involves body work, which I define as non-erotic 
services that involve contact with or access to private information related 
to the body. Body work is intimate because it requires physical exposure 
to and sometimes contact with the body, the revelation of private 
information about the body, or both. Examples include a doctor, nurse, 
personal trainer, manicurist, massage therapist, and bikini waxer. 
Second, work can be intimate because it involves care work, which I 
define as support with the needs of daily living. Care work is intimate 
because it requires exposure of personal, often sensitive information, and 
sometimes access to or knowledge about the body. Examples include 
childcare workers and home healthcare workers. 
Third, work can be intimate because it involves confidences work, 
which I define as work that entails access to private information. This 
category of intimate work includes both workers whose job descriptions 
include receiving confidences, such as a divorce lawyer or therapist, as 
well as workers who as a matter of fact often receive confidences, such 
as a wedding photographer or bartender. Confidences work also includes 
what we might call spiritual workers, such as clergy. 
Finally, work can be intimate because it entails erotic work, which I 
define as work that involves the performance of erotic services. Erotic 
work is intimate because it involves exposure of the body, the revelation 
of private sexual information, or both. Erotic workers include sex 
workers, exotic dancers, and phone sex operators. 
These categories have their differences, but they all share the presence 
of intimacy, whether it be in the form of body access, daily interactions 
about our personal lives, conversations about private affairs, or erotic 
acts. These categories also all share the feature of arising out of paid 
work, whether it is the check we write to the nanny, doctor, or divorce 
lawyer. In each of these situations, part of why the work has value is 
because the intimate worker knows of the contours of our body, our 
daily habits, the details of our marriage, or our erotic preferences. 
These categories of intimate work are meant to be fluid. A single 
intimate worker may perform multiple types of intimate work. For 
instance, a home health aide engages in care work by organizing her 
client’s apartment, in confidences work by learning about the client’s 
                                                 
2227, 2235–37 (1994). 
45. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 22. 
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family, and in body work by lifting the client and learning her 
medications. Generally, adding forms of intimacy increases the intimacy 
of the work. 
Within these categories and across them, intimate work will differ in 
some respects depending on the relationship between the worker and the 
consumer. Intimate work typically entails intimacy—personal 
information—flowing from the consumer to the intimate worker. This 
unilateral intimacy suffices to render a relationship intimate.
46
 Private 
information may also be shared by the intimate worker. Over time, the 
intimate nature of the interaction in one direction often leads the intimate 
worker to share personal facts about herself.
47
 
Even when a worker provides services that are not intrinsically 
intimate, the relationship between the worker and the consumer can 
grow intimate over time.
48
 A client’s relationship with a corporate 
lawyer, for example, does not require personal disclosures, but intimacy 
may nonetheless arise if a personal relationship develops between the 
client and the lawyer from ongoing interactions disclosing intimate 
information over time.
49
 In fact, developing intimate relationships with 
clients is one productivity strategy employed by workers in otherwise 
non-intimate, client-driven businesses, and employers often encourage 
the development of intimacy as a way to increase customer loyalty.
50
 
Regardless of the category in which it falls, intimate work exists along 
a spectrum of intimacy, with some intimate work relationships more 
intimate than others. Intimate work may be more or less intimate 
                                                 
46. See ZELIZER, supra note 40, at 14–15. 
47. Even when the work itself only requires intimate facts to flow in the direction of the consumer 
to the worker, bilateralism tends to increase the intimacy of the work. See, e.g., CAMERON LYNNE 
MACDONALD, SHADOW MOTHERS: NANNIES, AU PAIRS, AND THE MICROPOLITICS OF MOTHERING 
105–42 (2010) (mothers and nannies); RACHEL SHERMAN, CLASS ACTS: SERVICE INEQUALITY AT 
LUXURY HOTELS 184–97 (2007) (hotel workers and guests).  
48. Stephen R. Marks, Intimacy in the Public Realm: The Case of Co-Workers, 72 SOC. FORCES 
843, 847 (1994) (noting that “[n]urse/patient, doctor/patient, teacher/student, salesperson/customer 
and many other service relationships may become emotionally intense” (citations omitted)). 
Sociologists have long acknowledged the significant social relations that can develop between 
workers and customers. See Gregory P. Stone, City Shoppers and Urban Identification: 
Observations on the Social Psychology of City Life, 60 AM. J. SOC. 36 (1954). 
49. See Brian Uzzi, Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and 
Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 481, 488 (1999). 
50. See id. (documenting how workers who service clients use intimacy to gain information and 
build trust and quoting a relationship manager at a bank: “On the golf course, at a ball game, or the 
theater, they’ll let their guard down more often. We exchange information—not like marriage—
more like dating. I share information about me as a person. I let them see me and share with them 
our company’s struggles. As I share that information, I get information back. It’s kind of a quid pro 
quo.”).  
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depending on the features of the relationship, including the location of 
the relationship and the duration of the relationship. In terms of location, 
relationships centered in the home traditionally have been associated 
with the highest degree of intimacy, either because of the association 
with the family, the greater access to personal information, the higher 
likelihood of bilateral intimacy, or some combination of these features.
51
 
In terms of duration, work can be intimate in a single transaction, but 
intimacy tends to grow over time.
52
 The spectrum of intimacy across 
intimate work means that there are paradigmatic examples of intimate 
work, and other examples of intimate work that are more tenuous. Any 
legal response to intimate work must take this spectrum into account, as 
discussed in Part III. 
Before forging ahead, it is worth making explicit what the category of 
intimate work does not include. First, intimate work does not include co-
workers, even though co-workers can have quite intimate relationships,
53
 
and these intimate relationships share much of the same value and 
vulnerability of intimate worker-consumer relationships. There is greater 
variation in the extent to which intimate co-worker relationships arise 
out of work. For example, two friends may work for the same large 
corporation but never work together. This requires determining in what 
circumstances co-worker intimacy can be viewed as intervening in the 
employer-employee relationship.
54
 And because intimate relationships 
between co-workers are ubiquitous, intimate co-workers cannot be 
meaningfully set aside as a distinct category and instead requires 
assessing whether to reconsider the whole of employment law. This 
project, by contrast, considers the law of intimate work that does and 
should apply to a subset of workers and their consumers.
55
 
Second, intimate work does not include circumstances where the 
                                                 
51. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 634 (1980) 
(“[T]he privacy of the home is constitutionally protected not only because the home is seen as a 
sanctuary, privileged against prying eyes, but also because it is the place where most intimate 
associations are centered.”). 
52. The literature distinguishes between encounters—one-time transactions—and relationships—
an ongoing series of transactions. See Barbara Gutek et al., Achieving Service Success Through 
Relationships and Enhanced Encounters, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 132, 133 (2002). 
Relationships will tend to be more intimate, but an encounter can be, too.  
53. See Rosenbury, supra note 38, at 140. 
54. This doesn’t mean that the law shouldn’t intervene in the context of intimate co-workers, but 
that a more robust justification for doing so, and more considered line-drawing, may be required.  
55. The regulation of co-worker intimacy and the implications for work law—including both 
employment law and labor law—are the subject of future work. See Naomi Schoenbaum, 
Coworkers in Law (Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
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consumer is the employer. This excludes from the analysis nannies and 
home health aides directly employed by their charges, but includes those 
who are employed and placed by agencies.
56
 The employer-intimate 
worker-consumer triad coheres with the category of intimate work. The 
introduction of the intimate worker-consumer relationship into the 
employer-employee dyad poses challenges for the employer—for 
example, what obligations the employer has to ensure the relationship 
forms free of discrimination, and what rights the employer has to rupture 
the relationship between the intimate worker and the consumer. As 
fleshed out in the next Part, this complicates employment law, which 
primarily focuses on the employer-employee relationship. When the 
employer is the consumer of intimate work, however, the relationship 
remains a dyad, albeit of an altered sort. These differences prompt the 
need for a different legal response.
57
 
B. Common Consequences 
This section theorizes the common consequences of intimate work 
that render it a meaningful regulatory classification. While the law 
typically regulates work as an arm’s-length relationship between the 
employer and the employee, the hallmark of intimate work is the 
introduction of another party—the consumer—with whom the worker 
relates intimately. The introduction of this significant third party into the 
                                                 
56. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of exceptions that apply to these workers. Note that some 
workers who provide intimate services to consumers, for example, a divorce lawyer who owns his 
own firm and is self-employed, are not employees at all. These workers fall outside the scope of this 
Article, which addresses employment law’s treatment of intimate work.  
57. The question of what law should apply here is taken up in other work. See Naomi 
Schoenbaum, Why Families Aren’t Firms (Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). These relationships more squarely raise the question of why such intimate workers cannot 
opt in to at least some of the protections of family law, and the impact of their exclusion from family 
law. While scholars have likened the hiring of nannies to outsourcing by firms, see Meredith 
Johnson Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 254 (2012); Laura Rosenbury, 
Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 879–80 (2007), here the law forces outsourcing. 
One theory of the firm holds that we create firms because of asymmetric investments. See Oliver 
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1762–63 
(1989). If a person makes an investment in a factory that only one other person can use, the second 
person can hold up the first for the joint surplus, and so they go into business together before any 
investment. Intimate workers could be organized the same way—and when such services are 
provided inside a family we might say they are. But the law, through limits on adoption, polygamy, 
and so forth, makes bringing such work inside the family firm impossible. Because family law bars 
optimal forms of organization for this intimate work, there is a need for other legal intervention. 
Because the exemption recognized in Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), see 
supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text, applies to intimate workers who effectively work under the 
control of the consumer, I will address this exemption in later work.  
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employer-employee dyad distinguishes intimate work from other work in 
ways that require different regulation.
58
 This section catalogues the 
distinct features of intimate work, and the next Part turns to what this 
means for law. 
Because of the intimacy of the relationship, the protocols that govern 
the relationship between the intimate worker and the consumer are less 
those of market transactions and more those of personal relationships. 
This leads intimate workers and consumers to act altruistically, and to 
consider each others’ interests as much as, if not more than, simple 
dollars and cents.
59
 The personal rather than transactional protocols that 
govern intimate work relationships mean that these relationships provide 
critical emotional, material, and productive support. 
As for emotional support, work ties are pervasively referred to as 
“like family.”60 As one home health aide said of her genre of work: “We 
get close, very close. You are just as much a member of their family as 
their children or grandchildren.”61 Indeed, outside of the family, work is 
one of the most significant sources of emotional support for working 
Americans.
62
 This emotional support is present in the full range of 
intimate work, from care workers,
63
 to concierges at luxury hotels,
64
 to 
retail store workers,
65
 to hairstylists,
66
 to relationship managers at 
                                                 
58. See infra Part II.B–.E for implications of this third-party analysis for the category of intimate 
work.  
59. See Rebekah Peeples Massengill, “The Money Is Just Immaterial”: Relationality on the Retail 
Shop Floor, 18 RES. SOC. WORK 185, 187 (2009); Uzzi, supra note 14, at 675–82. Consider the 
remarks of one intimate worker: “The money is just immaterial . . . . I guess seeing that customers 
are happy and they’re leaving and people are laughing and having a good time, that is reaping all of 
the benefits of just being friendly and outgoing and knowing that they are our number one priority.” 
Massengill, supra, at 197–98. 
60. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND 
HOME BECOMES WORK 44 (1st ed. 1997); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION: HOW 
WAL-MART CREATED A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS 68, 96 (1st ed. 2009); Massengill, supra 
note 59, at 196. 
61. Deborah Stone, Caring by the Book, in CARE WORK: GENDER, LABOR AND THE WELFARE 
STATE 89, 104–05 (Madonna Harrington Meyer ed., 2000); see also HOCHSCHILD, supra note 60, at 
152–87 (describing ethnography of relationships developing in caregiving setting); ZELIZER, supra 
note 40, at 163–93 (collecting studies of relationships developing in caregiving settings).  
62. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY 242–44 
(2010) (collecting studies documenting the prevalence of intimacy between workers and consumers 
and the importance of these relationships).  
63. See Stone, supra note 61, at 104–05. 
64. See SHERMAN, supra note 47, at 106, 184–86. 
65. See Massengill, supra note 59, at 197–99 (detailing how customer relationships are important 
to retail workers’ meaning of work). 
66. See GRANT MCCRACKEN, BIG HAIR: A JOURNEY INTO TRANSFORMATION OF SELF 186 (1995) 
 
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
2015] INTIMATE WORK 1181 
 
garment factories
67
 and commercial banks.
68
 Intimate workers and their 
consumers also provide each other material support with direct cash 
assistance as well as in-kind support, such as computer equipment and 
legal advice.
69
 
Beyond emotional and material support, intimate work relationships 
are critical for intimate workers’ professional success. These 
relationships generate productivity by motivating intimate workers and 
consumers to act altruistically and perform additional work to support 
one another.
70
 Intimate work relationships enhance extra-role work: 
discretionary behavior that is not directly or explicitly recognized by the 
formal reward system, but that nonetheless promotes the effective 
functioning of the organization.
71
 
Intimacy also serves as a conduit for information that aids in work 
success. On the one side, consumers may provide information about 
intimate workers to others, sponsoring them and conferring legitimacy 
by backing up their reputations with superiors and prospective 
customers.
72
 On the other side, intimate workers secure additional 
private information from consumers that help them provide better 
service.
73
 These productivity benefits of intimate work mean that strong 
relationships with consumers justify price premiums, reduce employee 
training costs, and lower turnover, all of which lead to higher firm 
profits.
74
 Intimate consumers also get lower interest rates on loans
75
 and 
lower billing rates from corporate lawyers.
76
 
                                                 
(describing how hairstylists serve as sources of support to customers with personal problems, 
counseling customers and allowing them to unburden their “souls,” cutting hair while also cutting 
away guilt). 
67. See Uzzi, supra note 14, at 677. 
68. See Uzzi, supra note 49, at 488–89. 
69. See ZELIZER, supra note 40, at 178–81. 
70. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts As Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543, 550 
(1982) (explaining how altruism leads workers to work harder than necessary not for a raise or a 
promotion, but for better treatment of their coworkers); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS 
TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 95 (2005). 
71. See Stone, supra note 61, at 95 (healthcare workers and patients); Uzzi, supra note 14, at 680 
(factory managers and customers); Uzzi, supra note 49, at 490 (bank managers and clients).  
72. See Scott E. Seibert et al., A Social Capital Theory of Career Success, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
219, 223–24, 232–33 (2001) (finding that sponsorship through social ties enhances career success). 
73. See Uzzi, supra note 49, at 488. 
74. Chi Kin Yim et al., Strengthening Customer Loyalty Through Intimacy and Passion: Roles of 
Customer–Firm Affection and Customer–Staff Relationships in Services, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 
741, 741 (2008). 
75. See Uzzi, supra note 49, at 482, 496–98. 
76. See Brian Uzzi & Ryon Lancaster, Embeddedness and Price Formation in the Corporate Law 
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The work context enables intimacy to generate different forms of 
support than that afforded by intimates outside of work. While family 
and friends provide support that undoubtedly confers work benefits,
77
 
intimate work relationships nonetheless offer work support in ways that 
family and friends cannot. When intimacy arises at work, it primes the 
altruism that intimacy generates to take on productive forms simply 
because work-related support is much easier for work intimates to 
provide.
78
 Moreover, some productive support requires information that 
family and friends cannot provide. 
Intimate work also provides unique support precisely because it is 
commonly separated from our family lives and takes place in a more 
structured form than family or other non-work intimacy. This means that 
work offers the riches of intimacy—pleasure, playfulness, humor, 
affection, and even flirtation or sex—but with the order and boundedness 
of work and without the unending demands of family that can reduce the 
pleasure of intimacy at home.
79
 As Arlie Hochschild has documented, 
while family was traditionally seen as the haven from the heartless world 
of work, for some, work has become a haven from the unbounded and 
unregulated stress of the family, particularly for women, who feel family 
pressures more acutely than men.
80
 As one worker noted about her 
relative caregiving abilities at home and at work: “I’m a good mom at 
home, but I’m a better mom at work.”81 
While intimacy at work is more regulated than family or other non-
work intimacy, the work environment also provides for the repeated 
contact intimacy needs to flourish.
82
 In an era of “solo bowlers,” once we 
have completed our schooling, the regular proximity necessary to 
generate intimate support is rarely available except through work.
83
 
                                                 
Market, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 320, 335 (2004). 
77. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 79–81 (2d ed. 1993) 
(documenting how, beyond providing childcare, wives host business clients, take notes, and engage 
in other supportive behaviors that help husbands succeed at work).  
78. For example, in an intimate relationship between a consumer and her nurse, personal trainer, 
or hairstylist, the fact that the intimacy arises in the workplace means that the consumer will often 
have the opportunity to learn about the workplace dynamics, which puts her in a position to give the 
worker more informed advice about how to deal with a superior or a coworker, as the consumer may 
also have had the chance to get to know these persons.  
79. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 60, at 35–52. 
80. See id. at 38–42. 
81. Id. at 42. 
82. See id. at 35–52. 
83. See id. at 40–44 (describing how regular contact in the workplace affords the opportunity for 
intimacy to develop there); PATRICIA M. SIAS, ORGANIZING RELATIONSHIPS 65–70 (2009) (same). 
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Work thus provides the unique setting that allows meaningful intimacy 
to develop outside the family. This special combination of regulated and 
regular intimacy means that the support we receive from intimate work 
is a “uniquely intense” form of support.84 The experience of ongoing 
mutual discovery in a realm where it is always partially secluded is more 
explosive than in the realm of the family where members are already 
fully disclosed through constant contact.
85
 
Finally, the close worker-consumer relationship in the regulated 
context of work also holds value as a key site for promoting equality. 
Focusing on relationships between co-workers, Cynthia Estlund 
persuasively sets forth the case for work as a critical site of civil society 
where workers develop ties of empathy and solidarity with their fellow 
citizens.
86
 She highlights how regulating discrimination promotes more 
diverse workplaces, and how relationships between workers of different 
races then play a role in combatting racial bias.
87
 Precisely due to the 
intimacy of worker-consumer relationships, intimate work holds the 
promise to be such a civil society site on steroids. Closer relationships 
between parties of different races or other protected identity 
characteristics have a greater potential for overcoming biases than more 
distant relationships.
88
 
Introducing a close intimate worker-consumer relationship into 
employment not only produces value, but also produces four key 
vulnerabilities for workers and consumers alike. First, intimate work 
                                                 
See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2010) (describing the decline of communal activities in America since the middle of 
the twentieth century). 
84. See Marks, supra note 48, at 846. 
85. See id. 
86. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000). 
87. Id. at 4. 
88. Professor Estlund discusses the mixed evidence behind the contact hypothesis—that bringing 
people of different backgrounds together reduces biases—and ultimately concludes that it is likely 
to have validity in the work context in light of the circumstances of work. See id. at 22–29. 
According to some research, one feature of some intimate work—hierarchy—would undermine the 
effect of contact. See id. Other research, however, suggests that the most important factor in 
promoting contact’s positive effect is a closer personal relationship. See id.; Yehuda Amir, Contact 
Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations, 71 PSYCHOL. BULL. 319 (1969) (finding that intimate contact is an 
important factor in contact reducing prejudice); Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some of 
My Best Friends”: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward 
Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996) (finding that contact, 
and especially close contact, with gays and lesbians was correlated with more positive attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians). Intimate work of course is defined by closeness, and thus this factor 
supports the conclusion of a positive effect of contact in the context of intimate work.  
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
1184 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1167 
 
generates value because of the freedom that intimate workers and 
consumers enjoy in forming meaningful relationships. But this also 
leaves workers and consumers vulnerable to discrimination in the 
formation of these relationships, and in particular, to the employer’s 
promotion of discriminatory preferences that interfere with the formation 
of these relationships.
89
 
Second, intimate work generates value because of the altruism that 
intimate workers and consumers manifest toward one another. But this 
leaves workers vulnerable to sacrifice, because their altruism may result 
in extra work on behalf of consumers that the employer does not 
compensate.
90
 Moreover, employers may discipline intimate workers 
when their altruism entails advocating for the consumer against the 
employer’s poor treatment. 
Third, intimate work generates value because of shared information 
and emotional closeness. But this leaves workers and consumers 
vulnerable to exposure by having this personal information revealed or 
misused.
91
 Moreover, both parties are vulnerable to having the 
information turned against them as a way to inflict emotional harm. 
Finally, intimate work generates value because of the investments 
workers and consumers make in these relationships. But this leaves 
workers and consumers vulnerable to lost investments when these 
relationships rupture, as these investments are relationship-specific, and 
are not portable when the relationship ends.
92
 
A fuller explication of the vulnerabilities must wait until the next Part, 
as it is only by revealing the law’s ad hoc approach to intimate work that 
the vulnerabilities of intimate workers and consumers are brought into 
sharp relief. This is because the law’s failure to recognize and protect the 
value of intimate work plays a large role in producing these 
vulnerabilities. 
All told, the value and vulnerability that the intimate worker-
consumer relationship produces means that for intimate workers, the 
consumer is just as (if not more) important than the employer for 
determining wages, conditions, and the overall work experience.
93
 And 
                                                 
89. See infra Part II.B. 
90. See infra Part II.C. 
91. See infra Part II.D. 
92. See infra Part II.E. 
93. See Dorothy Sue Cobble & Michael Merrill, The Promise of Service Worker Unionism, in 
SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 160 (Marek Korczynski & Cameron Lynne 
Macdonald eds., 2009) (“This attitude prevails regardless of whether the worker’s income is derived 
wholly from the customer (the professional in private practice or the self-employed home cleaner), 
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for consumers, work—and its regulation—has a significant impact on 
key aspects of participation in civil society, including the receipt of 
medical, legal, and other important services. 
II.  THE LAW OF INTIMATE WORK (AND WHAT IS 
MISSING) 
Current law divides the regulation of intimacy and the regulation of 
work, with separate principles of family and market respectively 
governing each sphere. Law has no coherent approach to regulate a 
social reality, like intimate work, that combines the two. This ad hoc law 
of intimate work harms intimate workers and consumers by failing to 
protect the unique value and guard against the unique vulnerability of 
intimate work. The result is a law that permits employers to promote 
discrimination in the formation of intimate work bonds, to fail to 
compensate and even discipline intimate workers for their altruism, to 
expose intimate workers and consumers to emotional harm, and to break 
valuable intimate work bonds with impunity. 
This Part begins by laying out the challenge intimate work poses for 
law in light of the categorical regulation of intimacy and work. It then 
sets forth the existing law of intimate work, how it fails to address the 
value and vulnerability of intimate work, and the resulting harms. It 
proceeds in a roughly chronological path through the intimate work 
relationship—from the formation of the relationship and the 
discrimination that may taint it, to the sacrifice and exposure risked once 
the relationship is developed, and finally to the loss of value that can 
result when the relationship ruptures. 
A. Legal Categories of Intimacy and Work 
A brief discussion of the regulation of intimacy and work aids in 
understanding law’s shortcomings with regard to intimate work. The 
categorical regulation of intimacy and work presents a challenge for a 
reality like intimate work where the two categories overlap. 
In some situations—namely within the family—law protects 
intimacy.
94
 Family law recognizes the value intimate relationships 
generate by promoting intimate bonds based on affection and support 
                                                 
only partially so (the waiter, bartender, or cab driver), or not at all (the nurse or teacher).”). 
94. Scholars have explored how family law circumscribes its protection for care and support to 
the domestic family. See generally Murray, supra note 29; Rosenbury, supra note 29.  
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within the domestic family.
95
 Law also protects family intimates from at 
least some of the vulnerabilities that can arise in the context of close 
relationships, including the risk of sacrifice,
96
 exposure to emotional 
harm,
97
 and lost investments in the relationship.
98
 But family law 
categorically excludes intimate work from its protections by covering 
only those in family or family-like relationships.
99
 Workers and 
consumers are not covered, regardless of how intimate they are.
100
 Note 
that family law is decidedly ambiguous on discrimination, and, in 
marriage at least, permits parties to engage in it.
101
 
In other situations—namely within the market—law protects work.102 
Work is subject to standard marketplace regulation, including contract 
law and tort law, as well as to law that applies especially to the work 
                                                 
95. Family law creates barriers to entry that encourage selectiveness in entering intimate 
relationships and makes relationships sticky with waiting periods and formal legal process 
requirements for dissolution of these relationships. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. 
BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 211–21, 1386–
96 (3d ed. 2006).  
96. Family law imposes reciprocal duties of care and support on spouses to guard against 
unreciprocated altruism. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3900, 4300 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Family law also 
guards against unreciprocated sacrifices by compensating them at the end of the relationship. See, 
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A)(viii) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(providing that homemaking services are considered in property distribution at divorce).  
97. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 869–73 (1993) (discussing 
ways in which law protects spouses from emotional abuse, while acknowledging limits); Melissa 
Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate 
Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1270–71 & n.67 (2009) (discussing criminalization of adultery and 
other acts that cause emotional harm in marriage). 
98. Family law protects individuals from the loss of relationship-specific investments by 
distributing these investments at the end of the relationship through property distribution, alimony, 
and child support and custody determinations. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal 
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 447, 476–79 (1996). 
99. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 95, at 211–21, 1350–1405. 
100. Cf. Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 163, 174–79 (2011) (discussing how the law’s categories mean that an individual must be 
categorized as either a family member or a worker). 
101. The law has moved decidedly toward banning the state from discriminating in the context of 
the family, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (declaring bans on interracial marriage 
unconstitutional); George v. George, 409 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1979) (requiring that divorce law be sex 
neutral); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (declaring constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage), but still permits individuals to discriminate in making decisions about 
who to marry or adopt. See also Emens, supra note 29, at 1315–18.  
102. See Zatz, supra note 43, at 380–83 (citing multiple exclusions of non-market work, 
including prison work and family work, from work law).  
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relationship, including employment law, antidiscrimination law, and 
labor law. The legal assignment of intimate relationships to the family 
results in a work law premised on the fact that the only significant work 
relationship is an arm’s-length one between employer and employee. 
This leads to a law of work that is often blind to the intimate worker-
consumer relationship and its value. 
Nonetheless, because family law simply excludes non-family 
intimacy, any law of intimate work must be found in work law. But the 
legal categories of intimacy and work create a law of intimate work that 
is insensitive to its circumstances. Sometimes, as with non-compete 
agreements, work law treats intimate work too much like other work. In 
these instances, it either fails to recognize the special circumstances of 
intimate work at all and treats all work as simply arm’s-length, or 
recognizes only a narrow slice of intimate work and fails to appreciate 
how this recognition should extend to a larger set of workers and 
consumers. Other times, as with exceptions to wage-and-hour and 
antidiscrimination law, when work law recognizes intimate work, it is 
too focused on intimacy. It applies regulatory terms from the family 
context that are out of place—indeed harmful—in the work context. 
These shortcomings of the ad hoc approach to intimate work—treating 
intimate work too much like work or too much like family—are 
documented in the remainder of this Part. 
B. Discrimination 
The introduction of the consumer into the employment relationship 
introduces a party who can discriminate against the intimate worker—
and a party against whom the worker can discriminate. While there are 
opportunities for a service recipient to discriminate against workers in 
many service encounters, intimacy enhances the salience of the 
particular worker and her identity to the consumer.
103
 
Intimate workers’ identities can be powerful signals. The intimate 
worker is in many ways inseparable from her product: the intimate 
services she provides.
104
 Thus the worker’s identity characteristics “serve 
as signifiers . . . shaping customers’ expectations about the service they 
                                                 
103. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and Employment 
Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113 Q.J. ECON. 835 (1998) (finding that the racial composition of 
an establishment’s customers has sizable effects on the race of who gets hired in jobs that involve 
direct contact with customers, and hypothesizing that this is due to customer preferences in 
relationships). 
104. See Leidner, supra note 14, at 100; Wharton, supra note 14, at 152.  
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are to receive.”105 The Filipina childcare worker, for instance, is 
perceived as caring, family-first, and docile;
106
 the gay male hairstylist is 
perceived as not only stylish but as a gifted interlocutor.
107
 While the 
signal may not be reliable, it is a cheap heuristic in a circumstance where 
information costs are high and biases run deep.
108
 
Because of the personal nature of the services, consumers may 
perceive identity to be relevant to the provision of services. Identity may 
be seen to confer expertise: The Jewish couple may believe that a Jewish 
wedding photographer will better capture their wedding, or the black 
patient may believe that a black doctor can better relate to her health 
circumstances.
109
 Identity preferences for intimate workers may derive 
from a belief that the consumer will face less discrimination from 
providers who share the consumer’s identity.110 The sensitive 
circumstances of intimate work can also lead consumers to be more 
comfortable with workers of a particular identity for more inscrutable 
reasons.
111
 For example, some women simply feel more comfortable 
                                                 
105. Wharton, supra note 14, at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
106. See Cameron Lynne Macdonald & David Merrill, Intersectionality in the Emotional 
Proletariat, in SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 93, at 113, 120–22 (explaining 
that “racial/ethnic groups are preferred by parents [for caregivers] based on their presumed qualities 
that are rooted in their ethnicity,” and quoting a childcare placement agency owner: “people think 
that Filipinas are from a different planet where everybody cares about children” (citation omitted)). 
107. See Aaron J. Blashill & Kimberly K. Powlishta, Gay Stereotypes: The Use of Sexual 
Orientation as a Cue for Gender-Related Attributes, 61 SEX ROLES 783, 783–84 (2009) (finding 
that gay men are stereotyped as having feminine traits, such as empathy, nurturance, and 
sensitivity); Steven Petrow, The Problem with the Gays: What Happened to Our Style Gene, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-petrow/gay-
style-stereotypes_b_840469.html (discussing positive stereotypes of gay men, including 
stylishness).  
108. For the seminal discussion on labor market signals, see Michael A. Spence, Job Market 
Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356–61 (1973), and for more general discussion on signals, see 
Akerlof, supra note 70, at 489. 
109. See Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of 
Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462, 464 n.3 (2012) (collecting studies); Tamar Lewin, Women’s 
Health Is No Longer a Man’s World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at A14 (discussing how women’s 
preference for female gynecologist is partially rooted in the belief that they will understand 
women’s health better because they are women); Damon Adams, Patients Say Best Doctors Are 
Ones Who Look Like Them, AMEDNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.ama-assn.org/amed.  
110. Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients’ Beliefs About Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, 
and Satisfaction with Care, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 138 (2005) (analyzing surveys showing that 
minorities who perceive racism in the healthcare system are more likely to prefer physicians of the 
same race); Jennifer Malat & Mary Ann Hamilton, Preference for Same-Race Health Care 
Providers and Perceptions of Interpersonal Discrimination in Health Care, 47 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 173 (2006) (same). 
111. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 109 (in context of gynecologists, noting that “many women find 
it easier to talk to another woman when the subject is sexuality or menopause or pregnancy”). 
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with a female gynecologist or therapist.
112
 
Intimacy also strengthens the motivation to discriminate in the other 
direction—from employers (and intimate workers) against consumers—
although these preferences often have more to do with intimate workers’ 
religious and moral beliefs. This issue has recently received attention in 
the context of wedding vendors who have refused service to gay 
couples.
113
 
Employers play a role in cultivating and reinforcing these 
discriminatory preferences in intimate work settings, which interferes 
with the formation of meaningful intimate work relationships between 
workers and consumers.
114
 Indeed, employers’ reliance on identity 
characteristics in intimate settings may be the last bastion of acceptable 
overt discrimination.
115
 
Law fails to ensure that intimate workers and consumers form these 
meaningful relationships free from discriminatory influences. Even 
though intimate work increases motivation to rely on identity, work law 
provides less protection against discrimination instead of more, leaving 
intimate workers and consumers more vulnerable to discrimination. In 
this way, law regulates intimate work too much like the family, and fails 
to appreciate the unique value of intimate work—intimacy in a more 
regulated, equality-promoting setting than the family. Law here limits 
not only intimate workers’ equal employment opportunities, but also the 
promise of intimate work to enhance equality. 
                                                 
112. See id.; Raquel R. Cabral & Timothy B. Smith, Racial/Ethnic Matching of Clients and 
Therapists in Mental Health Services: A Meta-Analytic Review of Preferences, Perceptions, and 
Outcomes, 58 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 537 (2011) (finding a moderately strong preference for 
therapist of the patient’s own race and ethnicity); Bernadette M. Lauber & Jean Drevenstedt, Older 
Adults’ Preferences for Age and Sex of a Therapist, CLINICAL GERONTOLOGIST, 1993, at 13 (finding 
sex preferences for therapists); Cynthia F. Pikus & Christopher L. Heavey, Client Preferences for 
Therapist Gender, J.C. STUDENT PSYCHOTHERAPY, 1996, at 35 (finding that women prefer women 
therapists and that men express little preference).  
113. See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015), 
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ArlenesFlowersSJruling.pdf (upholding discrimination 
challenge to wedding florist’s refusal to serve gay couple against First Amendment defenses); Elane 
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (upholding discrimination challenge to 
wedding photographer’s refusal to serve gay couple against First Amendment defenses); Michael 
Paulson & Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona Cheers Bill Allowing Businesses to Refuse 
to Serve Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2014, at A1.  
114. See infra notes 137–46 and accompanying text. 
115. See Sam Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (documenting how employment discrimination scholarship has become 
focused on structural and unconscious biases in the wake of a reduction in overt discrimination). 
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1. Title VII and the BFOQ 
At first blush, employment discrimination law recognizes the harm of 
discrimination in service work by prohibiting employers from acting on 
discriminatory customer preferences.
116
 But rather than providing greater 
protection for discrimination in the intimate services context, the law 
provides less. Borrowing a page from family law’s acceptance of 
intimate discrimination,
117
 when work law recognizes work as 
sufficiently intimate, it removes sex discrimination protection. Title 
VII’s “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) exception118 
exempts from sex discrimination protection erotic workers whose work 
sufficiently turns on sexual titillation, such as erotic dancers;
119
 body 
workers who see or touch clients’ genitals, such as labor and delivery 
nurses or bathroom attendants;
120
 and confidence workers for whom a 
particular sex is necessary to achieve the therapeutic goals of their work, 
such as counselors at a psychiatric hospital for abused children.
121
 Even 
though race is not included in Title VII’s BFOQ exception, intimacy has 
in rare circumstances even justified employer reliance on race.
122
 
Recognizing the broader category of intimate work reveals the 
arbitrariness of BFOQ line-drawing. Work law here bows to some 
discriminatory customer preferences for intimate work services but not 
                                                 
116. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an 
employer cannot deny a woman an executive position in the international operations division based 
on foreign customer preference to work with men); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 
385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that employer cannot deny a man a position as flight attendant 
based on customer preference to be served by women). 
117. See Emens, supra note 29, at 1309–10. 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012). 
119. Yuracko, supra note 9, at 157 (discussing hypothetical cases as these cases have not been 
raised). 
120. See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (attendants 
responsible for cleaning bathrooms); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 
1982) (janitor responsible for cleaning bathrooms); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–
W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (labor and delivery nurse); Backus v. Baptist Med. 
Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (same). 
121. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996). 
122. In the case of a correctional facility that mimicked military basic training an employer was 
allowed to consider race in the selection of officers. In light of the “fierce intimacy” of the boot 
camp, race-matching was deemed essential for the black inmates “to play the correctional game of 
brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit.” Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). But 
see Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The privacy interest 
that is offended when one undresses in front of a doctor or nurse of the opposite sex does not apply 
to race.”).  
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
2015] INTIMATE WORK 1191 
 
others.
123
 It is difficult to justify why a discriminatory preference for a 
body worker who touches sensitive areas like one’s buttocks (e.g., a 
massage therapist or personal trainer) is denied while a discriminatory 
preference for a body worker who can possibly view one’s genitals (e.g., 
a janitor responsible for cleaning bathrooms) is accepted.
124
 Likewise, it 
is difficult to justify why a discriminatory preference based in 
confidences intimacy (e.g., a divorce lawyer, psychotherapist, or weight 
loss counselor) is denied while a sex preference based in bodily intimacy 
(again, the janitor) is recognized.
125
 
Each of these intimate work circumstances implicates quite intimate 
services, and the consumer’s preferences for the massage therapist, 
divorce lawyer, psychotherapist, or weight-loss counselor are not clearly 
less important or valid than for the janitor. These intimate services 
simply implicate different forms of intimacy, and consumers may be 
more sensitive to some forms of intimacy than others. Here the law sets 
apart and prioritizes certain body work over other forms of intimate 
work. Of course, the goal of the law may be to validate some intimacy 
preferences and not others.
126
 My point here is to highlight how the 
category of intimate work reveals that there is nothing natural about this 
line.
127
 
One might wonder whether acknowledging the broader category of 
intimate work might support expanding the recognition of the BFOQ. 
After all, if intimate work generates close relationships between the 
intimate worker and the consumer, this could argue in favor of granting 
consumers, and in turn employers, more leeway in selecting intimate 
workers with preferred identities. But the arbitrariness of the BFOQ’s 
line-drawing does not point in the direction of expanding the BFOQ to 
cover a broader range of intimate work. This is because the BFOQ 
                                                 
123. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257 (2003) (arguing that customer privacy concerns on which some BFOQ 
cases rest are just another form of customer preference). 
124. Compare Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999) (denying BFOQ 
for massage therapist), and EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying BFOQ for 
health club instructors), with Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1418 (accepting BFOQ for janitor), and 
Brooks, 537 F. Supp. at 1125 (same). 
125. Compare EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (denying BFOQ for 
weight-loss center counselors), with Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1418 (accepting BFOQ for janitor), 
and Brooks, 537 F. Supp. at 1125 (same). 
126. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26 (2000) (“Title VII does not simply displace gender practices, but rather 
interacts with them in a selective manner,” and by so doing, approves what it does not prohibit.). 
127. I am not alone in this critique of intimate work. See Kapczynsky, supra note 123; Yuracko, 
supra note 9. The category of intimate work provides another critique.  
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imports into work law an outdated strand of intimacy regulation from 
family law. The privacy BFOQ cases are built on heteronormative 
assumptions of the need for sexual privacy: that concerns about sex and 
sexual arousal raised by intimate work can be quelled by providing these 
services in a same-sex space.
128
 Civil and criminal law once did enforce 
a norm of no-sex between members of the same sex.
129
 This constructed 
same-sex spaces as a sex-free zone, creating the legal backbone for the 
BFOQ to validate same-sex privacy preferences in the context of 
intimate work. 
Recent changes in family law call this approach into question. With 
the unconstitutionality of sodomy laws,
130
 and the right to same-sex 
marriage,
131
 family law has moved far away from same-sex as a no-sex 
zone. BFOQ cases in the therapeutic context (e.g., the child sexual abuse 
counselor)
132
 that rely on the role-modeling theory—that a woman is 
better at modeling behavior for a girl and a man is better at modeling 
behavior for a boy—are seriously undermined by cases relying on the 
opposite conclusion to recognize the rights of same-sex couples.
133
 In 
view of the changes in family law, work law’s recognition of sex-based 
intimacy preferences enshrines an outdated law of intimacy.
134
 
Note also that despite the significance of intimate work relationships, 
failing to defer to consumer preferences does not impose an undue 
burden on consumers. Consumer preferences for intimate workers have 
                                                 
128. Note that cases recognizing the sex-based privacy BFOQ have conditioned it on a preference 
for same-sex service provision. See Olsen, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.  
129. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
130. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
131. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
132. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(accepting BFOQ in part based on theory that “‘[r]ole modeling,’ including parental role modeling, 
is an important element of the staff’s job, and a male is better able to serve as a male role model than 
a female and vice versa”).  
133. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931–36 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that 
state law defining marriage to exclude same-sex marriage was unconstitutional because, inter alia, 
argument that children fare better with a father and a mother was unfounded), aff’d sub nom. Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 909 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., 
concurring) (reasoning that “uniting men and women to celebrate the ‘complementarity’ of the sexes 
and providing male and female role models for children [is] based on broad and vague 
generalizations about the roles of men and women”). 
134. Sexual titillation cases can also be seen as deeply heteronormative, but these preferences 
have yet to be undermined in the same way. Others have called for greater reform to the 
discrimination norms in the context of the family. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: 
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE 
L.J. 875 (1998); Emens, supra note 29.  
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been shown to be quite malleable. While women currently prefer female 
gynecologists, this preference arose only relatively recently.
135
 Until just 
a few decades ago, when gynecology was a male profession, women saw 
male gynecologists without complaint.
136
 This shift in preference for 
female gynecologists, of course, was prompted in large part by Title VII 
requiring equal employment opportunities, which opened up the medical 
profession to women. Thus, there is reason to believe that consumer 
preferences can be responsive to the force of law. 
Even more fundamentally, work law fails to appreciate how work 
intimacy differs from family intimacy because of the employer’s role in 
determining preferences. Allowing individuals to exercise identity 
preferences in the context of family intimacy—i.e., to discriminate in 
who to date and marry—is meant to preserve individual liberty.137 By 
contrast, one of the unique strengths of intimate work is the existence of 
intimacy in a more regulated space, where equality and other values can 
be promoted as they are not in the context of family intimacy. And in the 
intimate work context, it is not simply individual preferences at stake. 
The employer plays a role in cultivating preferences, which may in fact 
constrain autonomy in forming intimate work relationships. Work law’s 
failure to appreciate the employer-intimate worker-consumer triad means 
that work law sometimes overlooks the employer-consumer relationship. 
Here, work law takes consumer preferences as given, failing to recognize 
the employer’s role in promoting discriminatory consumer preferences, 
and how this intervenes in the development of intimate worker-consumer 
relationships. 
As Vicki Schultz has made clear in the case of employees, individuals 
do not come to the workplace with fully formed preferences about 
work.
138
 Rather, work experiences themselves, which are largely 
determined by the employer, shape workers’ expectations and 
preferences.
139
 This is no less true for consumers, whose expectations 
and preferences are not formed solely or primarily from non-work-
                                                 
135. See Lewin, supra note 109. 
136. See id. 
137. See Emens, supra note 29, at 1356–57. 
138. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex 
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1749, 1815 (1990) (“[W]omen’s work preferences are formed, created, and recreated in 
response to changing work conditions.”). 
139. Id. at 1816 (describing the variety of mechanisms employers use to “structure opportunities 
and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to disempower most women from 
aspiring to and succeeding in traditionally male jobs”). 
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related experiences. Rather, our experiences receiving intimate work 
services, which are largely determined by employers, help to shape our 
expectations and preferences for intimate work services.
140
 
Multiple examples illustrate how employers make intimate worker 
identity more salient for consumers. A host of employer websites 
advertise intimate workers on the basis of protected identity traits. These 
are particularly popular for domestic care work: Rent-a-Grandma, Rent-
a-Grandpa, Rent-a-Mom, and Rent-a-Dad.
141
 The identity of the person 
tells you what she does: Rent-a-Grandma provides caregiving services; 
Rent-a-Grandpa does household repairs. Other businesses emphasize 
identity as a selling point for their intimate workers. Women Ob/Gyn, a 
“group of five female OB/GYN’s, and three nurse practitioners,” is 
“women, helping women.”142 The Women’s Law Group is a law firm 
specializing in divorce composed of “female attorneys who . . . practice 
law from a woman’s perspective.”143 
Yet other businesses make protected identity traits salient by allowing 
consumers to select intimate workers on the basis of these traits. When a 
customer is booking a massage, a spa’s first question is often, “Do you 
prefer a male or female massage therapist?”144 For online appointment 
bookings, some hair salons allow customers to select their hairstylist 
from a drop-down menu either by name, or by simply selecting “male” 
or “female.”145 Not only do such questions allow selection on the basis 
of sex, but they suggest that sex is the most important criteria for 
selecting an intimate worker. 
                                                 
140. Other scholars have recognized the role of the law in shaping even our most intimate 
preferences. See Emens, supra note 29, at 1366–74, for a discussion of the law’s role in structuring, 
as she terms it, “the accidents of sex and love”—the likelihood of dating and marrying people from 
particular identity groups.  
141. See sources cited supra note 13. 
142. WOMEN OB/GYN, http://www.womenobgyn.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (giving the 
tagline “Women, helping women” and describing “group of five female OB/GYN’s, and three nurse 
practitioners,” with a photograph of only women providers). In the past fifteen years, the rising 
demand for female gynecologists and obstetricians has led to a rise in all-female practices. See Kate 
Stone Lombardi, A Clinic Where All the Doctors Are Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at WE8. 
143. THE WOMEN’S LAW GROUP, http://thewomenslawgroup.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) 
(“At The Women’s Law Group, we understand that going through a divorce, custody issue, or other 
family law matter can be one of the most difficult times of your life. Our Tampa divorce attorneys 
and staff are here to help you.”); WOMEN’S DIVORCE RIGHTS, 
http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/about.php (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (“Founded . . . to 
support, inspire, and encourage women . . . during each stage of their lives.”).  
144. Erika Allen, The First Issue in Any Massage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, at ST22. 
145. See Select Service(s) and Employee(s), Bubbles Hair Salon, BUBBLES, 
https://bubbles.mylocalsalon.com/onlinebooking/v7410/Steps/SelectServices.aspx?siteid=d2a0742a-
0aba-e011-9d91-0050563fff01&event=1 (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).  
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In the context of erotic workers, employers cultivate the demand for 
sexy workers and the sex preferences that accompany them. Businesses 
convert food servers and bartenders into intimate workers who sell 
sexual titillation in restaurants, bars, and clubs like Hooters, and with it 
cultivate sex-specific preferences—typically for women—in these 
otherwise sex-neutral roles.
146
 
But without a concrete adverse employment action (e.g., failure to 
hire), the employer’s promotion of discriminatory consumer preferences 
does not result in a Title VII claim.
147
 While Title VII bars employers 
from “classify[ing]” employees or applicants in a way that “deprive[s]” 
them of employment opportunities,
148
 an employee would have a 
difficult time proving causation: that a sex-segregated drop-down box, 
for example, was a classification that limited employment opportunities. 
Moreover, much of this discrimination is at the hiring stage, and these 
types of claims are notoriously rare and difficult to prosecute.
149
 
To the extent that law permits employers to cultivate and reinforce 
consumers’ discriminatory preferences, this helps to shape preferences 
by legitimating rather than disrupting such preferences, particularly by 
creating the environment in which intimate services are delivered. If 
consumers have their preferences accommodated, this reinforces their 
preexisting view that this is the only acceptable way these services may 
be delivered. Employers’ role in constructing discriminatory preferences 
then interferes with the free formation of meaningful intimate work 
relationships. 
This can have a significant impact on the employment opportunities 
of intimate workers. Discriminatory preferences can lead to fewer 
customers or worse reviews, which can reduce earnings and limit work 
opportunities more generally.
150
 Systematic discriminatory preferences 
                                                 
146. Diane Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New 
Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 78–100 (2007) (detailing how casino 
bartenders are sexualized); Ann C. McGinley, Harassing “Girls” at the Hard Rock: Masculinities 
in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1229, 1271–74 (same). The well-known case of 
Darlene Jespersen involved a bartender who was eroticized into a “bar babe” by her employer’s 
imposition of a sex-specific grooming code. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
147. See, e.g., Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring adverse 
employment action for Title VII claim to proceed); Jones v. Reliant Energy, 336 F.3d 689 (8th Cir. 
2003) (same). 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
149. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as 
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting Model,” 30 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 99, 140 (2007). 
150. See Laurence M. Kahn, Customer Discrimination and Affirmative Action, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 
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for intimate workers of a particular identity can also have more 
systematic consequences, including occupational segregation, as workers 
decide what jobs to fill based on consumer demand. Gynecological 
medicine, for example, has become increasingly female-dominated as 
more women express a preference for female gynecologists.
151
 
A few courts have begun to recognize the role that employers play in 
shaping discriminatory preferences for intimate workers. In a case 
denying a residential care facility’s claim that residents’ racial 
preference for certified nursing assistants constituted a BFOQ, the court 
proposed that the employer could “attempt to reform the resident’s 
behavior after admission.”152 A case denying sex as a BFOQ for massage 
therapists went further, discussing how the employer perpetuated 
customers’ biases by asking for their sex preference.153 The court 
suggested that the spa could instead provide customers with a 
“description of the therapists’ qualifications,” and could quell privacy 
concerns by informing customers of draping policies and telling them 
that they “can instruct therapists about where they may and may not 
touch.”154 The court was confident about the impact on customer 
preferences: “More information about the process, along with a reduced 
focus on gender and an increased focus on qualifications, may alter the 
extent to which clients of both sexes are willing to engage the services of 
a male.”155 
2. Public Accommodations Law 
The law regulating discrimination against consumers also does too 
little to protect them from employer-promoted bias. Public 
accommodation laws ban businesses from discriminating against 
consumers, but they nonetheless allow employers to act in ways that 
continue to promote biases against both consumers and intimate 
workers.
156
 Unlike consumer preferences for intimate workers of a 
                                                 
555 (1991) (finding that customer discrimination can result in long-run wage differentials). 
151. See Lewin, supra note 109 (documenting that women now comprise over seventy percent of 
ob/gyn residents and attributing this to patient demand and quoting chairman of the Council on 
Resident Education in Obstetrics and Gynecology that this is “a huge issue for male medical 
students”).  
152. Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2010).  
153. Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1070 (D. Ariz. 1999).  
154. Id. at 1072–73.  
155. Id. at 1074. Both men and women overwhelmingly express a preference for a female 
massage therapist when asked. See Allen, supra note 144. 
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (banning discrimination in public accommodations on 
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particular identity arising out of privacy interests, the basis for intimate 
worker preferences for consumers of a particular identity is more often 
grounded in religion or the right to expression, for example, wedding 
vendors who prefer not to serve gay and lesbian couples out of a 
religious objection to same-sex marriage. Intimate workers and their 
employers have typically lost in cases brought by consumers challenging 
discrimination against them under public accommodations laws.
157
 
Despite consumers prevailing in these cases, the public 
accommodation cases give short shrift to the role of the employer in 
cultivating discrimination affecting both consumers and intimate 
workers. Take the well-known case out of New Mexico that upheld a 
finding of discrimination against a wedding photographer who refused to 
provide services to gay couples in violation of the state public 
accommodations law.
158
 The employer argued that the law compelled the 
expression of support for gay marriage, which the employer objected to 
as violating the right to freedom of expression and free exercise of 
religion.
159
 In rejecting these defenses, the court noted that the employer 
could continue to express its views by “post[ing] a disclaimer on their 
website or in their studio advertising that they oppose same-sex 
marriage.”160 
                                                 
the basis of race, national origin, and religion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.) (banning discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of, 
inter alia, race, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, spousal affiliation).  
157. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (holding 
that doctors who refused fertility treatment to lesbian patient violated state public accommodation 
law); Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003) 
(holding that divorce lawyer who catered to women clients violated state public accommodation law 
by refusing to represent male client); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) 
(holding that wedding photographer who refused to service gay couples violated state public 
accommodation law). I exclude from consideration laws that exempt certain body workers (doctors) 
from performing certain services (abortions) on the basis of religious objection because these laws 
exempt services rather than persons from the protection of public accommodations laws.  
It is not yet clear whether this will change in the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), which allowed employers an exception from the mandate to 
provide contraception coverage in their health care plans on religious grounds. Two noted scholars 
have concluded that concern that the decision will broaden religious exceptions for employers in 
other contexts is overblown. See Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Hobby Lobby in the Long Run, 
CORNERSTONE (July 1, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp/blog/hobby-lobby-in-the-
long-run. Note that an employer’s religious freedom defense in a case like Elane would arise under 
a state analogue to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that controlled in Hobby Lobby, as that 
statute applies only against the federal government. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997).  
158. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 53. 
159. Id. at 63. 
160. Id. at 59, 68 (noting that the public accommodation law also does not require the employer 
 
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
1198 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1167 
 
This type of employer action not only undermines the law’s aim at 
preventing dignitary (and even material) harms to protected groups; it 
cultivates the exact discriminatory preferences against consumers that 
the law was meant to combat. Such public expressions reinforce the 
discriminatory preferences of the intimate workers who provide services 
at the firm. A firm that provides wedding photography services to the 
public while openly expressing opposition to gay marriage signals 
discriminatory preferences to gay customers, while remaining in 
technical compliance with the law. Such a firm is unlikely to get any gay 
couples as customers, and thus intimate workers will not need to 
confront or put to the side their biases in the provision of intimate 
services. 
Moreover, such employer actions reinforce discriminatory preferences 
not only for consumers, but for intimate workers. The same New Mexico 
law that bans sexual orientation discrimination in public 
accommodations also bans such discrimination in employment.
161
 A sign 
posted by the employer disapproving of gay marriage cultivates and 
reinforces biases against gay workers as well, and likewise signals to gay 
applicants that they are not welcome as employees. Again, without an 
adverse employment action, there is no relief for this cultivation of 
discriminatory bias by employers.
162
 
C. Sacrifice 
The value-generating altruism that is a hallmark of intimate work 
means that both the intimate worker and the consumer may act against 
their own self-interest to benefit the other.
163
 For example, employers 
                                                 
“to either include photographs of same-sex couples in its advertisements or display them in its 
studio”).  
161. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.) (“It is an 
unlawful discriminatory practice for . . . an employer [with fifteen or more employees] . . . to refuse 
to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment against any person otherwise qualified because of . . . the 
employee’s sexual orientation . . . .”); id. § 28-1-7(F) (“It is an unlawful discriminatory practice 
for . . . any person in any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or indirectly, in 
offering or refusing to offer its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to any person because 
of . . . sexual orientation . . . .”).  
162. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text. 
163. For discussions of how certain forms of work can be invisible—and the adverse 
consequences—see, for example, ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 7 (2d ed. 2003) (providing the seminal study on invisible 
emotional labor—work we do to create a particular feeling or state of mind in others—and 
documenting a variety of resulting harms); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1307 (2000) (explaining how invisible work is not rewarded formally or 
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who engage in cost-cutting strategies may be saved from their adverse 
effects on customers by intimate workers’ willingness to increase their 
work efforts without additional compensation.
164
 So, for example, in 
response to layoffs, intimate workers may intensify effort or work more 
hours.
165
 “[B]ecause they care,” intimate workers “are not as prepared to 
jeopardize their relationship with those for whom they care in pursuit of 
their own self-interest as other workers may be.”166 
Sometimes intimate workers sacrifice by violating employer policies 
to benefit consumers. A particularly telling example comes from a recent 
study of Motherhood, Inc.
167
 The now defunct company provided 
instruction and guidance to new mothers and relied on its employees to 
develop intimate relationships with customers.
168
 But the company also 
relied on employees to recommend its products consistently, even 
though doing so would undermine their function as trusted confidantes 
to their clients, which presumably makes the company valuable to its 
customers.
169
 To develop intimacy and perform the work required, 
employees had to engage in a “difficult decoupling” of their intimate 
relationships with customers and the employer’s profit motive, captured 
well by one employee’s comment: “It’s hard to support moms by 
upselling.”170 Many employees opted out of such difficult decoupling by 
refusing to recommend the company’s products.171 
Such risky sacrifices by intimate workers come in many forms. Home 
health aides violate the policy against giving out their home telephone 
numbers to their clients or visiting them off hours.
172
 A nurse engages in 
                                                 
informally). 
164. See Susan Himmelweit, Caring Labor, 561 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 27, 33 
(1999). 
165. Id.; Paula England, Emerging Theories of Care Work, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 381, 390 (2005) 
(explaining that “emotional bonds put care workers in a vulnerable position, discouraging them from 
demanding higher wages or changes in working conditions that might have adverse effects on care 
recipients”). 
166. Himmelweit, supra note 164, at 33 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of 
caregivers); see also England, supra note 165, at 390 (describing this as “[a] kind of emotional 
hostage effect”). 
167. See Catherine Turco, Difficult Decoupling: Employee Resistance to the Commercialization 
of Personal Settings, 118 AM. J. SOC. 380 (2012). The company name nicely evokes the core 
tension of intimate work: the fundamentally intimate nature of motherhood and the fundamentally 
instrumental nature of the market.  
168. Id. at 389–91, 396. 
169. Id. at 398–400.  
170. Id. at 380, 399. 
171. Id. at 398. 
172. See Stone, supra note 61, at 105. Stone also explains how hospice volunteers choose not to 
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a “small act of rebellion” by unclipping the hospital phone, pulling out 
its batteries, and closing a particularly vulnerable patient’s room door to 
“sit[] down beside her patient, just to be near.”173 
The employer determines the consequences of these intimate worker 
efforts by either rewarding these efforts, or, by contrast, failing to reward 
or even penalizing workers for them. Engaging in intimate behaviors that 
go unrewarded, or, worse yet, result in discipline, puts intimate workers 
at risk of foregoing the material rewards of work—compensation and 
continued employment.
174
 Note that although consumers also engage in 
altruism, intimate workers’ sacrifices render them more vulnerable 
because employers have far greater ability and motivation to impose 
harmful consequences on workers than on consumers. 
Work law regulates the rewards and penalties that result from 
employment to ensure adequate compensation for workers’ efforts and to 
protect against workplace injury and retaliation. A number of 
protections, such as minimum wage guarantees
175
 and retaliation 
protection,
176
 are afforded when the employee is engaged in work. But 
when it comes to intimate work, the law fails to compensate all of the 
work that intimacy generates, and fails to protect intimate workers who 
act on behalf of their consumers from retaliation. To the extent the law 
recognizes intimate work as different here, it again borrows a page from 
family law’s regulation of intimacy, subtracting protection for the 
compensation of intimate work, rather than adding more. This leaves 
intimate workers vulnerable to employers’ failure to compensate, and 
even to penalize, their altruism. Law’s failure to compensate and protect 
altruism undermines the relational and emotional aspects of market 
behavior that are fundamental to intimate work. 
1. Wage-and-Hour Law 
Despite the additional productive efforts that intimate work generates, 
intimate workers may not end up materially better off for these efforts. 
                                                 
get Medicare certification, which would allow them to be paid, because they do not want to comply 
with the intimacy boundaries imposed by the program, such as the policy against giving out home 
phone numbers. Id.  
173. Sara Corbett, The Last Shift, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2003, at 61. 
174. For example, the nurse who fails to answer her hospital phone to spend quality time with a 
patient might be disciplined for doing so, see id., or a Motherhood, Inc. employee who refuses to 
recommend the company’s products to her consumers might be terminated for failing to meet her 
sales quota, see supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.  
175. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime). 
176. See, e.g., id. § 158 (retaliation protection). 
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Combining intimacy with work increases the odds that intimate work is 
made invisible to the employer. When work is viewed as undergirded by 
love and affection, its productive value is not appreciated.
177
 Friendship 
between the intimate worker and the consumer, for example, may be 
seen as an adjunct to the work, or perhaps even a distraction, rather than 
a critical feature of intimate work that tends to enhance efficiency.
178
 
Work law does little to address the invisibility of intimate work or 
ensure that intimate workers are compensated for all of it, and instead 
treats intimate work too much like family intimacy. The Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) guarantees a minimum hourly wage plus 
overtime.
179
 To the extent this law recognizes intimate work, it removes 
rights to compensation, just as the law restricts compensation for work 
done in the family.
180
 Wage-and-hour protection is limited for some of 
the most intimate domestic workers.
181
 
                                                 
177. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the family, see generally Silbaugh, 
supra note 9 (arguing that the law fails to recognize housework as work because of the affectionate 
familial context in which the work is performed).  
178. See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 62, at 241–44 (discussing how, in the context of coworkers, 
intimacy in the workplace is seen as antithetical to production based on a commonly held view that 
intimacy and production should exist in separate spheres).  
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime).  
180. This principle of non-compensation for work done within the domestic family is colorfully 
expressed in one seminal case refusing to enforce a contract for a wife to receive compensation for 
providing care for her ailing husband: “[E]ven if few things are left that cannot command a price, 
marital support remains one of them.” Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 655 (1993). 
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (exempting babysitters and companions for the elderly from 
overtime and minimum wage); id. § 213(b)(21) (exempting live-in domestic workers from 
overtime). In 2013, the Department of Labor issued a rule that would extend wage-and-hour 
protection to companions for the elderly (typically referred to as home healthcare workers) 
employed by third-party agencies, see 29 C.F.R. § 552.109 (2014), after the Supreme Court had held 
that these intimate workers were exempt under existing regulations, see Long Island Care at Home, 
Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 162 (2007). Before the rule was to take effect on January 1, 2015, the 
regulation was vacated, see Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 76 F. Supp. 3d 138, 140 (D.D.C. Dec. 
22, 2014), but that decision was reversed, see Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, No. 15-5018, 2015 
WL 4978980, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2015). In 2013, the Department also narrowed the definition 
of “companionship” work that qualifies for the exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 552.6(b) (excluding 
from the exemption companions who spend more than twenty percent of their time on care work). 
This regulation was also vacated, see Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 78 F. Supp. 3d 123, 124 
(D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2015), a decision that was likewise reversed, see Home Care Ass’n of Am., 2015 
WL 4978980, at *1. It is too soon to tell whether the appellate rulings will be upset by en banc or 
Supreme Court review. 
Another notable set of intimate workers exempt from wage-and-hour protections is teachers. See 
29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (including within an exemption to the FLSA “any employee employed in the 
capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools”); 29 
C.F.R. § 541.303(a) (applying exemption to “any employee with a primary duty of teaching, 
tutoring, instructing or lecturing in the activity of imparting knowledge”); id. § 541.204(b) 
(expanding the “educational establishments” covered to include “an elementary or secondary school 
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Indeed, for purposes of coverage under wage-and-hour law, courts 
distinguish between efforts motivated by intimacy and efforts motivated 
by service to the employer, assuming that there is little or no overlap, 
and leaving intimate work uncompensated. In the case of a K-9 officer 
seeking compensation for the time he spent caring for his police dog at 
home, for example, the Second Circuit responded “[a]t some point, an 
officer’s attention to his assigned dog may not be provided primarily for 
the employer’s benefit but rather out of the caretaker’s own sense of love 
and devotion to the animal in his charge.”182 
So, when intimate workers engage in certain forms of intimacy, the 
law does not treat or protect these activities as work. The law’s division 
between intimacy and work does not reflect reality, as legal scholars 
have made clear in the context of the family.
183
 Intimate work can 
contribute as much value to the consumer and the employer as any other 
efforts of the intimate worker, and, in fact, adding intimacy to work 
often enhances its productive value.
184
 Recognizing the productive value 
of intimate work need not negate or undermine intimacy. Sociologists 
and economists have found that economic exchange coexists with 
motives of care and altruism in a range of relationships, and that workers 
can successfully combine motives of love and money.
185
 The law’s 
continuing divide between intimacy and work leaves intimate workers 
undercompensated for the value they generate. 
2. Retaliation 
Work law’s failure to recognize the overlap of intimacy and work also 
means that it does little to address the double bind that intimate workers 
face when employers penalize intimate workers for acting altruistically 
toward consumers. Work law that typically limits the harms that 
                                                 
system, an institution of higher education or other educational institution”). For a discussion of this 
problem in the context of adjunct professors, see Trisha Pande, Professors at the Poverty Line: 
Protecting Adjunct Professors Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Apr. 20, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author). 
182. Holzapfel v. Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 523 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Velez v. Sanchez, 693 
F.3d 308, 315, 330 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that whether a worker who lived with her stepsister’s 
family acted out of love in providing care for the children is one consideration in determining if she 
was an employee entitled to wage-and-hour protections). 
183. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 17–18 (documenting the valuable production done in the 
household); cf. Hasday, supra note 29, at 497–99 (arguing that economic exchange—a hallmark of 
productive market behavior—is ubiquitous in the family). 
184. See supra Part I.B.  
185. See ZELIZER, supra note 62, at 250–55; Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or 
Money—Or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 123 (2000). 
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
2015] INTIMATE WORK 1203 
 
employers can inflict on workers for doing their jobs and standing up for 
their rights does little to protect intimate workers who act on behalf of 
their consumers because work law, insensitive to the overlap of work 
and intimacy, sees these as acts of intimacy unrelated to work. Work 
law’s failure to extend protection against discipline to these acts of 
intimate work converts altruism into sacrifice. 
Work law that protects employees who advocate for their own work-
related interests fails to protect intimate workers who advocate for their 
work interests—their consumers. The National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) grants employees, whether unionized or not, the right “to 
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or 
protection” without retaliation.186 But the NLRA has ignored intimate 
worker-consumer bonds in evaluating when such activities are 
“mutual”—i.e., in furtherance of the interest of both the complaining 
employee and those on whose behalf she complains.
187
 For example, 
when a counselor in a facility for disturbed children protests the quality 
of treatment, this is viewed as only in the interest of the children and not 
also in the employee’s interest, and thus does not qualify as protected 
“mutual aid.”188 Courts will sometimes allow such cases to proceed, but 
only by contorting such actions to fit within work law’s narrow view of 
what counts as a work-related concern—self-interested economic 
gain.
189
 
                                                 
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158.  
187. As Richard Michael Fischl and Cynthia Estlund have argued, the application of the “mutual 
aid or protection” provision has been limited by work law’s conception of activity being in the 
employee’s work interest only when it is in the employee’s narrow economic self-interest. See 
Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of 
Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1992); Richard 
Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1989). 
188. See Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 35, 42 (1980) (counselors for troubled 
children who complained that proposed program changes would negatively affect the children); see 
also Five Star Transp., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42, 46 (2007) (school bus drivers who wrote letters to 
school about transportation safety concerns only “implicate[d] the safety of children, not the 
common concerns of employees”); Orchard Park Health Care Ctr., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 644 
(2004) (nursing home employees who called the state health department patient care hotline to 
report poor customer conditions “were concerned about the quality of the care and welfare of the 
residents, not their own working conditions”); Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. 
Gen. Counsel in the N.L.R.B. Office of Gen. Counsel, to Richard L. Ahearn, Regional Director of 
Region 19, The Wedge Corp., No. 19-CA-32981, 2011 WL 4526829 (N.L.R.B.G.C.), at *3 (Sept. 
19, 2011) (bartender’s Facebook posts regarding concerns about customer service are not protected 
because “employee concerns about the quality of care and the welfare of patients or clients are not 
interests encompassed by the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
189. See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr., 246 N.L.R.B. 351, 357 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d 
808 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a nurse who was terminated for protesting unsanitary conditions 
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Altruism itself—an endemic feature of intimate work—is not 
considered worthy of protection. An intimate worker acting to benefit 
the consumer necessarily implicates the interest of the worker not solely 
because it matters for her personal economic gain, although it does, and 
not solely because the intimate work relationship is a formative part of 
an intimate worker’s working conditions, although it is.190 For intimate 
workers, caring about the consumer means that the welfare of the 
consumer on its own affects the intimate worker’s welfare. 
Work law has yet to recognize how intimate workers’ tendency to 
sacrifice for their consumers could leave them unprotected against 
retaliation under other laws as well. Antidiscrimination law protects 
employees who complain of discrimination from retaliation.
191
 The 
forms of retaliation that are prohibited are quite broad—essentially 
anything that the employer can do that might dissuade a reasonable 
worker from complaining.
192
 In Thompson v. North American Stainless, 
LP,
193
 the Supreme Court recognized that an employer firing an 
employee’s fiancé after that employee complained of discrimination 
would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining.
194
 But no 
court has yet applied such a theory to intimate workers. So an intimate 
worker—say a camp counselor—who complained of discrimination 
could be retaliated against by an employer withdrawing resources from 
her campers without relief.
195
 
Occasionally, an intimate worker who sacrifices on behalf of a 
consumer and is then fired will be protected by a claim for termination in 
violation of public policy.
196
 But such claims turn on the fortuity of state 
                                                 
and inadequate staffing engaged in protected activity because her protest contained passing 
reference to employee work circumstances); Estlund, supra note 187, at 936.  
190. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of how the quality of intimate work bonds affects 
productivity and other conditions of work. 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he 
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he 
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter.”). 
192. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–74 (2011).  
193. 562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
194. Id. at 174. 
195. The Court expressly refrained from drawing any bright line that would limit its holding. Id. 
at 174–75. This holds promise for protection of intimate worker sacrifices. However, family-like 
intimacy—a fiancé—is a far easier case than a work intimate. I return to Thompson’s potential for 
the protection of intimate work in Part III.B.1.b, infra.  
196. Compare Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-Cnty., 851 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) 
(upholding claim for termination in violation of public policy brought by nurse who was fired after 
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law: the existence of a relevant state statute and a court willing to 
interpret it broadly to support the public policy at issue. 
D. Exposure 
The established intimate work relationship also renders consumers 
and intimate workers vulnerable to exposure. When one party gives 
another party access to private information, this creates a risk that the 
receiving party will not keep it confidential, or will use it against the 
other party.
197
 Because intimate work is premised on a consumer sharing 
private information with a worker,
198
 intimate work exposes the 
consumer to the vulnerability that the worker will misuse this 
information. And this risk of exposure can go in both directions. Because 
intimate workers often share personal information about themselves with 
consumers, and indeed rely on this type of intimacy to enhance the 
productive value of the relationship,
199
 intimate workers too can be 
vulnerable to this type of exposure. 
Intimacy also provides additional access and opportunity to impose 
other types of harm. It is well-known that work poses the opportunity for 
bullying, harassment, and abuse, and not only on the basis of protected 
identity traits.
200
 Intimate work only heightens the opportunity for such 
harm to occur, as intimacy provides additional avenues to push buttons 
and to emotionally manipulate one’s target.201 
The regular exposure that work often provides means that there is not 
a simple means for the intimate worker to avoid abusive or demeaning 
treatment by the consumer. In such circumstances, workers, if they 
remain in their jobs, have little choice but to accept the intimacy and its 
                                                 
complaining about poor patient care out of concern for patient based on state nursing law), with 
Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1242 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting 
claim for termination in violation of public policy brought by nurse who was fired after complaining 
about poor patient care based on nursing code of ethics).  
197. See Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 675–76 (2009) 
(discussing duty of confidentiality that arises in appropriate circumstances to protect against an 
abuse when principal shares private information with agent). 
198. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
200. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for Status-
Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 484–85 (2000) (documenting the 
prevalence of general workplace bullying). 
201. See Mara Brendgen et al., Verbal Abuse by the Teacher During Childhood and Academic, 
Behavioral, and Emotional Adjustment in Young Adulthood, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 26 (2007); 
Premilla D’Cruz & Ernesto Noronha, The Limits to Workplace Friendship: Managerialist HRM and 
Bystander Behaviour in the Context of Workplace Bullying, 33 EMP. REL. 269 (2011).  
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attendant emotional vulnerability. While intimate work poses similar 
risks to the consumer, they are typically less constrained from seeking 
services elsewhere in the market. 
While fiduciary duties guard against a small subset of intimate work 
exposure, the law fails to capture the full range of this vulnerability, 
treating much of intimate work too much like any other work. Duties to 
protect against the harms of exposure in intimate work relationships are 
owed only by some intimate workers toward their consumers—and not 
the other way around. Areas of work law, like workers’ compensation, 
that prevent or remedy workplace injuries are premised on a model of 
physical rather than interpersonal injury, and thus fail to address the type 
of exposure that intimate work generates. In this way, the law fails to 
take seriously the intimacy that is a predicate for productivity across the 
full range of intimate work and the risk of harm this imposes. 
1. Fiduciary Duties 
To the extent that work law recognizes the potential for harmful 
exposure from the intimate work relationship, it does so primarily in the 
form of fiduciary duties running from intimate workers to their 
consumers. Professional licensing standards and codes of professional 
ethics place legal and moral duties on intimate workers to avoid 
imposing a variety of harms on vulnerable consumers.
202
 Certain 
intimate workers, such as doctors and lawyers, owe formal fiduciary 
duties to their consumers because of the high levels of trust and 
dependence inherent in such relationships.
203
 Such relationships impose 
obligations on these intimate workers to, among other things, act in their 
consumers’ best interests and keep their confidences.204 
Beyond formal fiduciary duties imposed by virtue of relationship 
status, courts may impose duties of loyalty and care on the basis of trust 
and dependence arising out of the circumstances of a particular 
relationship. These are typically referred to as informal fiduciary 
relationships or confidential relationships.
205
 Courts that take a more 
                                                 
202. See ZELIZER, supra note 40, at 18–21 (recounting such a code for psychotherapists); Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 815–16 (1983) (discussing these standards for 
doctors and lawyers). 
203. See, e.g., Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(attorney-client); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (doctor-
patient).  
204. See Hasday, supra note 29, at 522–24. 
205. See Leib, supra note 197, at 700–02 (collecting cases denying claims for fiduciary duty 
based on friendship). 
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generous approach to the application of fiduciary duties have found such 
relationships to arise running from a number of intimate workers—
nurses,
206
 social workers,
207
 therapists,
208
 pastors,
209
 hairstylists
210—to 
their consumers. These fiduciary duties go a good way toward protecting 
consumers from exposure that may arise in the intimate work 
relationship. 
However, courts that take a narrower approach will deny fiduciary 
protection when a relationship is deemed to be among equals rather than 
between one dominant and one subordinate party.
211
 In these 
jurisdictions, intimate work relationships that are not seen to involve 
dominance by the intimate worker over the consumer will not merit 
fiduciary protection for the consumer.
212
 And this limitation will restrict 
the application of duties running from consumers to intimate workers, 
even when the parties develop a friendship, because the intimate worker 
will be unlikely to establish dominance by the consumer. Despite the fact 
that many intimate workers develop bilaterally intimate relationships as 
a way to produce closer and more productive bonds with consumers,
213
 
and are encouraged to do so by their employers,
214
 they may be without 
recourse should the consumer turn against them. The consumer, 
                                                 
206. See Estate of Bliss v. Williams, 18 Cal. Rptr. 821, 827 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (confidential 
relationship existed between decedent and nurse who took care of “his physical needs and quite 
frequently acted for him in his business and property matters”); see also Iacometti v. Frassinelli, 494 
S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (“It is that relationship where confidence is placed by one in 
the other and the recipient of that confidence is the dominant personality, with the ability, because of 
that confidence, to influence and exercise dominion over the weaker or dominated party, such as 
nurse and invalid, trusted business adviser and friend etc.” (citing Bayliss v. Williams, 46 Tenn. (6 
Cold.) 440 (1869)). 
207. Abeyta v. Soos ex rel. Cnty. of Pinal, 319 P.3d 996, 996 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Heinrich v. 
Silvernail, 500 N.E.2d 835, 836 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). 
208. United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012); In re Kimberly C., No. 3-11-0412, 
2011 WL 10481304 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 9, 2011). 
209. In re Succession of Stamm, 43 So. 3d 326 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
210. In re Brodbeck v. James, 915 P.2d 145, 152 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (“We find the close 
friendship and trust attested to by James and Hart [hairstylist] was sufficient evidence of the 
existence of a confidential relationship.”). 
211. See Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) 
(requiring one party “who enjoys a superior position in terms of knowledge and authority and in 
whom the other party places a high level of trust and confidence”); Leib, supra note 197, at 693, 702 
(describing two-part test requiring showing of “trust and vulnerability, dominance, or influence”).  
212. See, e.g., Grow v. Ind. Retired Teachers Cmty., 271 N.E.2d 140, 143–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1971) (rejecting informal fiduciary relationship running from retirement home and its workers to 
resident because requisite dominance was not present). 
213. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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precisely because of her situation at the intersection of intimacy and 
work, has an inside view of the intimate worker’s business and may 
become a trusted advisor and critical source of word-of-mouth 
advertising.
215
 Nonetheless, intimate workers’ exposure will often go 
unprotected. The obligations of consumers to intimate workers are then 
the same as any arm’s-length deal, sounding only in basic tort or 
contract. 
2. Harassment 
Moreover, while consumers can typically exit a relationship with an 
intimate worker that has become hostile or otherwise destructive, the 
intimate worker may only be able to do so by giving up her job. Intimate 
workers have little say about who receives their services.
216
 
Work law may require workers and consumers to come together by 
banning segregation, but aside from sexual harassment law, it does little 
to keep them apart.
217
 And sexual harassment law only addresses a 
narrow source of emotional harm that arises at work: when harassing 
conduct based on sex rises to the level of a hostile work environment.
218
 
Beyond the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, some 
jurisdictions outside the United States hold employers liable for failing 
to maintain an environment free of bullying or harassment.
219
 But even if 
such a standard were adopted here, the closeness of intimate work 
relationships means that they expose workers to the threat of emotional 
harm before conduct rises to the level of bullying.
220
 
                                                 
215. See supra Part I.B. 
216. This may not be true across the board, but it is a correlate of the definition of employment, 
which turns on an employer’s control over the employee’s work. See Matthew T. Bodie, 
Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 675 (2013) (“The ‘control’ 
test is the dominant standard for employment, both nationally and internationally.”). 
217. See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace 
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1230 (2011) (discussing the limits of U.S. law in intervening in 
harassment aside from sexual harassment).  
218. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (racially or sexually 
hostile work environment arises only when the conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter 
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment’” (quoting Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982))). See infra Part II.4 for further discussion of 
discrimination and sexual harassment law. 
219. See Clarke, supra note 217, at 1231 (collecting foreign legislation). 
220. For example, Quebec’s labor code bans “psychological harassment,” defined as “vexatious 
behaviour in the form of repeated and hostile or unwanted conduct . . . that affects an employee’s 
dignity or psychological or physical integrity and that results in a harmful work environment for the 
employee.” Act Respecting Labour Standards, R.S.Q. 2014, c. N-1.1, ch. IV, div. V.2, § 81.18 ¶ 1 
(Que., Can.). 
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3. Workers’ Compensation 
Nor does workers’ compensation—the law meant to remedy 
workplace injuries—adequately remedy the vulnerability to the 
emotional harms that can result from exposure. Workers’ compensation 
does recognize a small set of “extraordinary” instances of particularly 
trying intimate work and allows such intimate workers to recover for 
injuries that result from it.
221
 But, again, this law is too narrow to protect 
all intimate workers. For the vast majority of intimate work, courts tend 
to deny recovery on the theory that emotional exposure is just part of the 
job.
222
 Otherwise, the only protection against emotional harm afforded to 
intimate workers is the one provided to everyone in the form of tort law, 
which is reserved for egregious behavior.
223
 Despite the unique 
circumstances of intimate work, then, intimate workers are afforded little 
remedy for the harms their work can inflict. 
E. Lost Investments 
The development of intimacy typically requires investments in the 
relationship.
224
 The information exchange that develops between the 
intimate worker and consumer reduces the search for alternative partners 
because getting to know someone is costly.
225
 Norms of altruism and 
reciprocity too become more valuable over time.
226
 The “longer the 
                                                 
221. See, e.g., Smith-Price v. Charter Pines Behavioral Ctr., 584 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(allowing recovery for psychiatric nurse who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder where job 
required treating suicidal patients and treatment errors could result in death).  
222. See, e.g., Anthony v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 548 S.E.2d 273 (Va. Ct. App. 
2001) (denying recovery to social worker because confrontations with angry parents, including 
being pulled from her chair and thrown out of a house and being pushed off a porch, were not 
unusual occurrences for a social worker); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ill., 523 N.E.2d 
912, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (categorically denying recovery for mental distress arising from 
repeated stressful interactions with consumers because this would “open a floodgate for workers 
who succumb to the everyday pressures of life”). 
223. See, e.g., Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Ark. 1996) (requiring a showing of 
“extreme and outrageous” conduct that it is “utterly intolerable in a civilized community” to 
establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
224. See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. SOC. REV. 
95, 98, 100–03 (1988); Seibert, supra note 72, at 222. 
225. Uzzi, supra note 14, at 681 (explaining that the sharing of private information “in turn 
causes [individuals] to reduce their search for alternative information sources or exchange partners” 
because, inter alia, “the acquisition of information is costly,” and “thus, the more time devoted to 
information transfer with one party, the less time available for other ties”). 
226. See id. at 680–81 (discussing process by which trust develops between workers and 
consumers such that over time “economic exchange becomes embedded in a multiplex relationship 
composed of economic investments, friendship, and altruistic attachments”); cf. Naomi 
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[intimate work] relationship lasts the richer it becomes in debits and 
credits, creating an opportunity-rich social structure.”227 Because the 
value of intimate work derives from relationship-specific investments, it 
is largely lost when the intimate work relationship ends, either through 
termination or reassignment of the worker, or the worker or consumer’s 
departure.
228
 
Intimate work relationships can persist and still retain some of their 
value even when intimate workers and consumers are no longer working 
together.
229
 But rupturing the work relationship vastly reduces the value, 
and in particular, robs it of the unique features that make intimate work 
ties so valuable. The separation of the tie from work will tend to reduce 
the benefits derived from intimacy specifically found at work. Because 
the relationship is separated from an ongoing work relationship, the 
relationship will be less capable of supporting the intimate worker in her 
productive capacity. The consumer cannot communicate the same types 
of valuable information or provide on-the-spot support. And the 
separation of the tie from work will tend to reduce its intimacy. It is the 
regular interaction that work almost uniquely affords that helps to 
generate and maintain intimacy.
230
 If the separation of the relationship 
from work also involves a geographical move, this only further reduces 
valuable intimacy.
231
 
Despite the value of these intimate work relationships, work law 
leaves intimate workers and consumers perpetually vulnerable to these 
relationships being ruptured. Here, there is a law of intimate work that 
recognizes the bonds between intimate workers and consumers, but it is 
far too narrow. For most intimate workers, work law treats intimate work 
too much like all other work by affording far too little significance to the 
                                                 
Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1199 (explaining how developing strong 
bonds requires making investments over time). 
227. Uzzi, supra note 14, at 678 (explaining that “the identity of the individuals and the quality of 
their social ties are as important as the information itself,” and thus that without trusted information 
sources, the information itself is far less valuable).  
228. See RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 9 
(1992) (noting that “the connection, with whatever social [intimate] capital it contained, dissolves” 
and that “[i]f a firm treats a cluster of customers poorly and they leave, the social [intimate] capital 
represented by the firm-cluster relationship is lost”); Donald P. Moynihan & Sanjay K. Pandey, The 
Ties That Bind: Social Networks, Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention, 18 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 205, 210–11 (2007) (“Employees exiting an organization will lose the 
potential to use the carefully cultivated social [intimate] capital they have built.”); Schoenbaum, 
supra note 226, at 1207–15. 
229. See Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 1206–07 (focusing on coworkers). 
230. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
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relationship between the worker and the consumer and treating it as 
fungible. In this way, work law undermines the relational and emotional 
components of production that are integral to intimate work. 
1. Non-Compete Agreements 
Non-compete agreements limit workers’ ability to leave a firm and 
start a competing business or work for a competitor. Unlike most 
contracts, courts scrutinize these agreements because they limit the 
freedom to work and can restrain trade.
232
 Most jurisdictions uphold non-
compete agreements so long as they are reasonably limited in scope 
(geographic and durational) and purpose.
233
 In a few cases, the law of 
employee mobility does recognize intimate work. Traditionally, courts 
have scrutinized covenants not to compete for doctors and lawyers more 
carefully on the basis of the special nature of the relationship between 
these professionals and their customers.
234
 For other intimate workers, 
though, courts pay little heed to intimate work relationships and their 
value to both the worker and the consumer. 
In determining the validity of a covenant not to compete, courts look 
to whether the hardship to the worker or injury to the public outweighs 
the employer’s need to protect its legitimate interests.235 In determining 
injury to the public, courts assess whether the intimate worker’s services 
were “unique [or] uncommon.”236 When the services provided by the 
intimate worker are available elsewhere in the area, courts see no harm 
in barring access to a particular worker.
237
 The law here regards the 
service provided to be the only thing of value. The unique supportive 
value of these relationships, the investments made in them, and how 
these investments can enhance the value of the service provided are not 
considered. 
                                                 
232. See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993). 
233. Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y 
J. 101, 101–02 (2012).  
234. See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999) (invalidating doctor’s 
restrictive covenant because it interferes with the doctor-patient relationship); Cohen v. Lord, Day & 
Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that restrictive covenants among attorneys are 
prohibited on the basis of the lawyer-client relationship). Some courts have become more permissive 
in upholding these covenants against doctors so long as the community is not deprived of important 
medical services, but courts still scrutinize these agreements more closely than those for other 
intimate workers. See Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 866 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2006).  
235. See Hopper, 861 P.2d at 539–40; A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760 (N.C. 
1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
236. Hopper, 861 P.2d at 544. 
237. Id. 
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In determining hardship to the worker, courts assess whether she can 
practice her chosen profession. So long as the worker can continue 
plying her trade, courts deny that restricted access to particular 
consumers causes any hardship to the worker.
238
 This analysis regards 
intimate work as simply the provision of services, with the recipients of 
those services being interchangeable. This ignores the personal and 
professional value embedded in intimate work relationships. And 
intimate work provides yet another reason for courts to scrutinize non-
compete agreements. Because intimate workers tend to be myopic both 
about the extent of intimacy they develop with consumers and the 
duration of the employment relationship, they do not reach optimal 
contractual arrangements at the outset of employment relationships.
239
 
Courts do consider the employer’s loss of customers as a reason for 
upholding a restrictive covenant.
240
 In fact, some courts even rely on 
customers’ “close” and “personal relationships” with, and “love” for, an 
intimate worker as a reason to enforce a non-compete agreement; 
otherwise, this intimacy could result in the employer’s loss of 
customers.
241
 While an employer’s investment in creating the necessary 
conditions for intimate work relationships is a relevant consideration in 
assessing the validity of a non-compete agreement, it should not be to 
the exclusion of the intimate worker-consumer relationship. 
Defenders of current law might argue that the employer rightly owns 
the value of customer relationships generated by intimate work, because 
these relationships would not exist but for the employer selling the 
intimate worker’s services. But research on intimate work shows the 
importance of worker-consumer bonds for firm loyalty. Management 
literature on customer-firm loyalty has disaggregated customer relations 
with workers and with firms and has found that customer relations with 
workers, particularly intimate workers, drive customers’ loyalty to 
                                                 
238. See, e.g., id. at 543 (enforcing covenant that barred veterinarian from practicing small animal 
medicine because she could still practice large animal medicine); Mayne v. O’Bannon Pub. Co., No. 
31A05–1301–CT–5, 990 N.E.2d 525 (table), 2013 WL 3787601, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. July 17, 2013) 
(enforcing five-year non-compete agreement against manager with close relationships with 
customers); Zona Corp. v. McKinnon, No. PLCV201100247, 2011 WL 1663094 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 14, 2011) (enforcing non-compete against hairstylist). 
239. See infra Part III.A.2 for further explication of contracting and information deficits in the 
context of intimate work.  
240. See Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982) (enumerating 
employer’s loss of customers as a factor weighing in favor of enforcing non-compete agreement). 
241. Mayne, 2013 WL 3787601, at *3 (enforcing non-compete because manager “was the face 
of” the employer, “she knew the customers and their printing needs well,” and they “loved” her).  
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firms.
242
 In the intimate work context, “customers develop loyalty to a 
[firm] because of their loyalty to [workers],” who “function as prominent 
firm agents and whose performance represents a key characteristic of the 
service.”243 
This research highlights the fiction of the agency relationship in the 
context of intimate work. That is, consumers develop relationships with 
the agent (the intimate worker) that is quite distinct from their 
relationships with the principal (the employer). Recognizing intimate 
work requires recognizing that the delegation from the principal (the 
employer) to the agent (the intimate worker) means that when the 
intimate worker acts on behalf of the employer, she is not fungible. 
Rather, the agent comes to stand in for the principal in ways that 
overtake the role of the principal. Given the significance of intimate 
work relationships to both consumers and workers, the law’s failure to 
appreciate this imposes significant harms. 
The law’s cramped recognition of intimate work relationships—only 
in the context of doctors and lawyers—is far too narrow to protect the 
value of intimate work relationships. The worker can start a competing 
business only in another location without her intimate ties or after time 
has passed and the ties have weakened. This is especially concerning in 
light of the rise in employers’ reliance on non-compete agreements,244 
including as applied to a range of intimate workers.
245
 
                                                 
242. See Yim et al., supra note 74, at 746, 750, 752–53 (finding that loyalty relationships between 
workers and customers transfer to the firm for relational/intimate services (hair salon) but not 
transactional services (fast food)); see also Neeli Bendapudi & Robert P. Leone, Managing 
Business-to-Business Customer Relationships Following Key Contact Employee Turnover in a 
Vendor Firm, 66 J. MARKETING 83, 83–84 (2002) (collecting studies finding that in many cases, a 
customer’s relationship with an employee who is closest to them is stronger than the customer’s 
relationship with the firm; that these relationships result in positive emotional ties and customer 
loyalty to the firm; and that intimacy between customer and worker strengthens these relationships); 
Robert W. Palmatier et al., Customer Loyalty to Whom? Managing the Benefits and Risks of 
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 185, 185 (2007) (developing the concept of 
salesperson-owned loyalty—“fealty directed specifically toward an individual salesperson 
independent of his or her affiliation with the selling firm”—and finding that while customer loyalty 
to the worker and the firm both contribute to a customer’s willingness to pay a price premium, only 
customer loyalty to the worker contributes to sales growth and selling effectiveness);  
243. Yim et al., supra note 74, at 752–53 (finding such in context of hair salon). 
244. Viva R. Moffatt, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem Within Noncompetition 
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010); Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1149 (2009). 
245. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in an Array of Jobs, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2014, at B1 (documenting how restrictive covenants, once largely limited to the 
technology and sales sectors, are entering a range of fields, including those involving intimate work, 
such as camp counselors and hairstylists).  
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Of course, non-compete agreements might be seen as recognizing the 
value of intimate work ties from the perspective of the employer, who is 
seeking to maintain ties between the intimate worker and her consumers 
by keeping the worker in place. But the employer could protect these 
intimate work relationships with a fixed-term contract or through non-
legal mechanisms that enhance loyalty.
246
 A covenant not to compete 
does not guarantee that the intimate worker remains with her current 
employer, but does limit the worker (and her consumers) from retaining 
intimate work relationships when starting a competing business. 
2. Duty of Loyalty 
Likewise, the duty of loyalty bars employees who contemplate 
starting competing businesses from soliciting customers while still 
employed.
247
 The law generally distinguishes between announcing the 
competing business and soliciting customers, permitting the former but 
not the latter.
248
 In so doing, work law fails to afford intimate workers 
the opportunity of meaningfully planning their professional trajectories. 
Given the significance of particular intimate work relationships to 
intimate workers, the success of the new business, and even the intimate 
worker’s desire to start it, may turn on whether her established 
relationships will follow her. Realistically assessing the prospect that 
customers will follow the intimate worker to her new business will likely 
involve the intimate worker crossing the line from announcing to 
soliciting. Despite the significance of intimate work relationships, courts 
have presumed that any contact initiated by the intimate worker to the 
consumer is solicitation.
249
 So an intimate worker who attempts to 
maintain just the intimate side of the relationship risks running afoul of 
the duty to her employer. 
This orientation of work law misconstrues the loyalty of both the 
intimate worker and the consumer as directed to the employer rather than 
to each other. As for the worker, prioritizing loyalty to her employer 
ahead of loyalty to her consumers not only wrongly casts the employer-
                                                 
246. See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
1179, 1200–18 (2010), for a discussion of the variety of legal and non-legal mechanisms employers 
use to cultivate employee loyalty. 
247. See Selmi, supra note 233, at 103.  
248. See id.  
249. See Zona Corp. v. McKinnon, No. PLCV201100247, 2011 WL 1663094 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 14, 2011). 
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employee relationship in the old mold of master-servant law,
250
 but fails 
to recognize how the intimate worker-consumer relationship can be just 
as, if not more, significant than the one between the worker and the 
employer.
251
 Likewise, prioritizing the consumer’s relationship with the 
employer over the relationship with the intimate worker fails to 
recognize that customer loyalty is driven more by bonds with the 
intimate worker than with the employer.
252
 
3. Trade Secrets 
The law of unfair competition and trade secrets similarly fails to 
appreciate the significance of intimate work. Trade secret law may 
protect customer lists if the identity of customers is kept sufficiently 
confidential.
253
 Once customer identity is a trade secret, former 
employees are not allowed to use these customer lists for their own 
advantage.
254
 In assessing whether customer lists, and thus the 
development of customer relationships, are subject to trade secret 
protection, courts often look to the employer’s efforts in developing 
these customer relationships.
255
 Courts view these efforts as leading to 
                                                 
250. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
(1983) (arguing that the whole of work law, including the duty of loyalty, continues to rely on a 
view of employment premised in master-servant relations). 
251. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing how relationships with consumers can 
be more important than wages for intimate workers). 
252. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
253. See, e.g., Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Vt. 2001) (requiring that a trade secret: 
“(A) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, 
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use; and (B) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy” and noting that forty-one states use the same standard).  
254. A minority of courts allow employees to rely on information retained by memory or 
interaction with customers. See K.H. Larsen, Former Employee’s Duty, in Absence of Express 
Contract, Not to Solicit Former Employer’s Customers or Otherwise Use His Knowledge of 
Customer Lists Acquired in Earlier Employment, 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (2015) (“While a number of cases 
have approved a former employee’s use of his knowledge of customers with whom he dealt in a 
previous employment, only a few cases appear to treat the former employee’s right to use 
memorized information in competition with his former employer as an absolute or unqualified 
right.”). Compare Movie Gallery U.S. v. Greenshields, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1265 (M.D. Ala. 
2009) (“While . . . detailed customer lists are properly viewed as trade secrets, a salesperson’s built-
up goodwill and relationships are not,” and thus “individual, customer-by-customer information is 
not properly considered a trade secret.”), with Calisi v. Unified Fin. Servs., 302 P.3d 628 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2013) (holding that confidentiality determines trade secret protection, regardless whether 
employee memorized information), and Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921 (Mass. 
1972) (same). 
255. In addition to being sufficiently secret, a trade secret must derive value from not being 
“readily ascertainable” to competitors. How much effort the employer put in to developing the 
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the employer’s rightful ownership of these relationships.256 
The law fails to consider the significance of the intimate worker-
consumer relationship in developing and maintaining the consumer’s 
relationship with the firm, even when the employer was initially 
responsible for identifying the consumer. Research shows that it is more 
likely the intimate worker’s efforts—and not the employer’s—that 
secures an intimate consumer’s loyalty.257 So while the employer may 
have initially gotten the customer on board with the company, it is the 
intimate worker who kept her there. For example, contrary to the results 
of one case, the relationship between an intimate worker who cleaned a 
customer’s home may be just as, if not more, responsible for the 
consumer’s ongoing use of the firm than the phone call that initiated the 
consumer’s contact with the firm.258 The law denies the significance of 
the intimate worker role, and downplays evidence that consumers want 
to maintain relationships with intimate workers, not employers.
259
 This 
leaves the intimate worker and the consumer with the ability to continue 
the intimate work relationship only on pain of litigation. 
4. Termination and Transfer 
Beyond employee mobility, work law also provides remedies for 
termination and unemployment. But these remedies fail to include the 
value lost when intimate work relationships are ruptured. As for 
remedies upon termination, unemployment insurance (UI) provides 
partial wage replacement,
260
 but nothing for the loss of intimate work 
ties. Cash is a poor remedy, as relationships cannot simply be bought on 
the market.
261
 Other than the experience rating of UI programs, which 
serves as a mild disincentive to termination,
262
 work law plays little role 
                                                 
relationship speaks to whether the customers’ identity was “readily ascertainable.” Dicks, 768 A.2d 
at 1282. 
256. See, e.g., Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newberry, 147 N.E.2d 724, 727 
(N.Y. 1958) (focusing on the employer house cleaning business’s efforts in identifying customers 
through cold calling prospective customers from neighborhoods they thought might have demand). 
257. See sources cited supra note 242. 
258. Town & Country, 147 N.E.2d at 727. 
259. Cupid Diaper Serv. v. Adelman, 211 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814–15 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (rejecting 
evidence that customers wanted to continue service with intimate worker with whom they had an 
established relationship).  
260. See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 
335, 340 (2001). 
261. See Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 1215. 
262. See Lester, supra note 260, at 341.  
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in preventing or remedying the harms of lost intimate ties. Job training 
programs address human capital factors that can make unemployment 
difficult, but do little for the lost capital of ruptured intimate work ties.
263
 
Even when the law provides relief for unlawful termination, the 
remedies fail to recognize lost intimate work bonds. For example, Title 
VII’s relief for discriminatory firings allows for compensatory damages 
for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm, as well as injunctive relief 
including reinstatement to “make [victims] whole.”264 But courts do not 
account for lost intimate ties in fashioning a remedy for termination, or 
in considering whether reinstatement is necessary to make the terminated 
employee whole.
265
 
The employer’s relocation or reassignment of intimate workers also 
ruptures relationships between intimate workers and consumers. As 
compared with termination, the law imposes even fewer protections 
here.
266
 Aside from the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN 
Act),
267
 just about the only limit against such dislocations is a claim of 
discrimination. But even then, work law does not recognize a cause of 
action unless the transfer is accompanied by changes in the overtly 
economic “terms and conditions of . . . employment,” such as salary or 
benefits.
268
 Work law leaves those who lose intimate work relationships 
                                                 
263. See SEC’Y OF LABOR, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A 
COMPETITIVE SOCIETY 19 (1986). 
264. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) 
(2012) (providing that remedies for unlawful discrimination include “reinstatement or hiring of 
employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems 
appropriate”); id. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (allowing compensatory damages, including “future 
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of 
life, and other nonpecuniary losses”). 
265. Many courts assessing whether reinstatement is a necessary remedy consider whether the 
terminated employee has found comparable employment. See Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th 
Cir. 1973); Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 979 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). This 
fails to recognize that the new workplace is not comparable in that it will almost certainly require 
the loss of significant consumer relationships. Courts have even recognized intimate relationships 
with consumers as a reason to reject reinstatement, when there is a concern that the employee’s 
experience litigating with the employer will lead the employee to poison the employer’s 
relationships with its customers. See EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp 919, 927 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d without op., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1977).  
266. See Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 1169–70 (explaining how the WARN Act encourages 
worker relocations without recognizing their significant costs).  
267. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012). The WARN Act, which applies to a small minority of employees, 
requires covered employers to give notice of mass layoffs and relocations. See Schoenbaum, supra 
note 226, at 1169–70. 
268. Brennan v. Tractor Supply Co., 237 F. App’x 9, 23–24 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kocsis v. 
Multi-care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 855 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 
487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256–57 (4th Cir. 1999)) 
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as a result of discrimination without a remedy. 
Critics might argue that considering lost relationships is inconsistent 
with employment law, which is premised in economic rewards, and not 
emotional ones.
269
 But intimate work fundamentally challenges the view 
that work is simply about dollars and cents, rather than also about 
personal relationships, both for their intrinsic rewards and their role in 
productivity.
270
 Even if we accept this broader notion of the rewards of 
work, we might still be concerned about adding relational considerations 
to these employment law doctrines because of the judicial administration 
problems associated with tricky line-drawing questions (e.g., when 
intimate work relationships are close enough to warrant protection). 
While an approach that requires distinguishing between different types 
of worker-customer relationships is undoubtedly more burdensome than 
simply distinguishing between family and non-family relationships, the 
additional cost is warranted given the benefits that it brings.
271
 I return to 
how to address these difficult line-drawing questions in the next Part.
272
 
III.  THEORIZING A NEW LAW OF INTIMATE WORK 
The shortcomings of the current ad hoc approach of intimate work 
law naturally lead to the question of what, if anything, lawmakers should 
do in response. This Article argues for a unified field of intimate work 
law that would recognize the significance of the intimate worker-
consumer relationship and the need to protect the value and guard 
against the vulnerability that the relationship generates. A law that 
recognizes the intersection of intimacy and work would not only enhance 
the value and minimize the vulnerability that intimate work produces, 
but would bring jurisprudential benefits to the fields of family law and 
work law by remedying their categorical regulation of intimacy and 
                                                 
(holding that reassignment to selling houses in blighted neighborhood was not an adverse 
employment action because “absent any decrease in compensation, job title, level of responsibility, 
or opportunity for promotion,” the adverse economic consequences were too speculative).  
269. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 
227–28 (2013) (noting that scholars typically conceive of the goal of employment law to be 
economic efficiency or rectifying imbalances of bargaining power between employer and 
employee). 
270. See supra Part I.B. 
271. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011) (acknowledging “difficult 
line-drawing problems concerning the types of relationships entitled to protection” in evaluating 
retaliation against third-parties under Title VII, but explaining that such a concern fails to “justif[y] 
a categorical rule that third-party reprisals do not violate Title VII”). 
272. See infra Part III.B.1.d. 
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work, which has been repeatedly critiqued, particularly as harmful to 
women. Once the conceptual intimacy-work divide is bridged, such a 
law could be implemented rather easily. In fact, the law can largely 
proceed incrementally, with analogical adaptation of time-proven 
doctrines to the circumstances of intimate work. This Part begins with a 
consideration of why law—and, in particular, why a unified law of 
intimate work—is needed, and then turns to a discussion of how to 
implement this new field of intimate work law. 
A. Why Law 
Before delving into the details of the new law this Article proposes, a 
discussion of why this law is needed is in order. First, legal recognition 
of intimate work would not only ameliorate the harms of current 
regulation, but would begin to break down the categorical regulation of 
intimacy and work, generating a law that better reflects the reality of our 
lives, with benefits for gender equality. Second, market failures and a 
reduction in employee bargaining power in the context of intimate work 
render private ordering inadequate to maximize welfare, requiring the 
injection of law. 
1. The Benefits of Law 
Part II set forth the harms of the current law of intimate work: that 
meaningful intimate work relationships will be tainted by discrimination; 
that intimate workers will be undercompensated and even disciplined for 
the altruism their work entails; that intimate workers will be exposed to 
excessive emotional harm; and that intimate workers and consumers will 
lose the value of substantial investments in these relationships. A new 
law of intimate work would enhance the welfare of intimate workers and 
the public as their consumers by remedying these harms. The next Part 
addresses why private ordering fails to maximize welfare, and law is 
needed to achieve this goal. 
Before addressing these market failures, the broader benefits of a law 
of intimate work that would consistently recognize the intersection of 
intimacy and work and the value and vulnerability it produces deserve an 
airing. The benefits of a unified field of intimate work law can be 
glimpsed more easily when this Article is situated within an emerging 
body of scholarship—what I call “the new intimacy” scholarship—
challenging the law’s special treatment of intimacy. Two strands of 
scholarship are most prominent here. First, scholars have highlighted the 
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ways in which the family is treated separately from the market.
273
 These 
scholars have documented the harms that flow from failing to apply the 
rules of the market to the family, including the law’s failure to 
compensate work done in the context of family, such as housework
274
 
and surrogacy,
275
 and the law’s acceptance of discrimination in the 
family.
276
 Second, scholars have highlighted the ways in which the law 
treats the family as the exclusive repository for the rights and privileges 
associated with intimacy, and fails to recognize or beneficially regulate 
intimacy outside the family.
277
 
These new intimacy scholars have explored how the categorical 
recognition of intimacy and work fails to reflect reality and undermines 
intimate relationships
278
 and work,
279
 which can both go unrecognized 
under this regime.
280
 These scholars have also argued that the law’s 
current regulation of intimate settings harms women, who do more of the 
intimate family work that is not compensated, and who historically have 
been disadvantaged in the marital relationship, and thus stand to gain 
from the recognition of relationships based in other forms of intimacy.
281
 
This Article extends and deepens the critiques of the new intimacy 
scholarship by exposing the harms that flow from the law’s failure to 
recognize the intersection of intimacy and work in the form of intimate 
work. In addition to ameliorating the harms delineated in Part II, 
recognizing intimacy in the context of work allows for an alternative 
model of intimacy with special benefits, including the promotion of 
                                                 
273. See generally Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: 
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 
753 (2011) (introducing and exploring “family law exceptionalism”); Olsen, supra note 29 
(highlighting legal separation of family and market).  
274. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 28–67. 
275. See Hasday, supra note 29, at 513–15. 
276. See generally Emens, supra note 29, at 1315–18 (highlighting acceptance of discrimination 
in dating and marriage). 
277. See generally Murray, supra note 29, at 387 (highlighting how family law ignores extended 
family members and other non-family caregivers); Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 191 (highlighting 
how family law ignores non-domestic support, especially friendship). 
278. See, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 212–20 (privileging marriage undermines friendship).  
279. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 28–67 (documenting how law regulating the family fails 
to recognize work done in the context of intimacy). 
280. See, e.g., id. at 84–85 (failing to compensate housework undermines this work).  
281. See generally Hasday, supra note 29, at 517–22 (failing to recognize economic exchange in 
intimate relations reinforces women’s dependence); Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 212–20 (arguing 
that privileging marriage and ignoring other forms of support reinforces hierarchical gender 
dynamics of marriage); Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 14–15 (failing to require payment for work in 
family harms women, who do most of this work).  
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gender equality. 
Intimate work is uniquely valuable because it differs from family or 
family-like intimacy.
282
 The all-consuming model of family intimacy 
tends to disproportionately burden women.
283
 Legal recognition of an 
alternative model of less demanding intimacy can then bring more 
equality to the law of intimate relationships. Intimate work’s position in 
the regulated context of work makes it easier, as compared with the more 
private context of the family,
284
 to guard against the vulnerability to 
sacrifice and exposure that tend to arise when intimacy is present. The 
legal recognition of intimate work also allows meaningful intimacy to 
flourish in a context in which equality in the formation of intimacy can 
be promoted.
285
 
A comprehensive field of intimate work law also holds the promise of 
dissolving the legal categories of intimacy and work to create a more 
fluid notion of both, within and without the family. A law that 
recognizes the overlap of intimacy and work would further the new 
intimacy law’s project of protecting and valuing intimacy even when it 
arises outside the family, and protecting and valuing work even when it 
arises outside the market. Dissolving the categories of intimacy and 
work is important not only for protecting and compensating those who 
engage in this type of extra-categorical intimacy and work, but also for 
gender equality. As noted above, it is women who are disproportionately 
harmed by the failure to recognize intimacy outside of the family and the 
failure to recognize work outside the market.
286
 
Valuing intimacy in the context of work would be a step toward 
valuing the relational and the feminine within the market, and another 
step toward gender equality. Relationships have long been aligned with 
the feminine in the masculine-feminine binary.
287
 To the extent law 
continues to undervalue the relational aspects of work, law continues to 
undermine feminine traits as integral to market success.
288
 While 
                                                 
282. See supra Part I.A. 
283. See supra Part I.A; Rosenbury, supra note 38, at 139–41 (arguing that support provided 
disproportionately by workers of certain identities is an important axis for employment 
antidiscrimination law to interrogate).  
284. See Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225 (1998).  
285. See supra Part I.A. 
286. See sources cited supra note 281. 
287. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499–1501. 
288. Scholars have recognized the importance of relationships for contracting, business, and 
corporate settings, but curiously this has not been extended to intimate relationships. See Margaret 
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999) (setting forth a relational theory of the corporation); Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual 
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relational traits can be found in both men and women, the devaluing of a 
trait typically associated with women will tend to disproportionately 
burden women.
289
 Moreover, while it is difficult to quantify, the best 
evidence available suggests that women do more intimate work than men 
and thus are disproportionately burdened by the harms that flow from the 
law’s current shortcomings.290 
Valuing work in the context of intimacy might also have a beneficial 
impact on weakening the divide between work and intimacy in the 
family. As referenced above, feminist legal scholars have long critiqued 
the law’s failure to recognize housework and childcare for its 
disproportionately harmful impact on women.
291
 Recognizing that 
intimacy and work can overlap in the market and thus that meaningful 
intimacy arises at work could further the project of recognizing that 
intimacy and work can overlap in the family and that meaningful work 
can be done there. 
The regulation of intimate work within the preexisting regulatory 
structure of work aids in ensuring that the recognition of intimacy is in a 
form that preserves its unique benefits. One of the challenges of 
expanding the legal recognition of non-family intimates is how to do so 
without simply grafting the family model on to them.
292
 Applying 
regulation from the family realm to intimate work relationships risks 
burdening these relationships in a way that undermines their special 
benefits. Intimate work’s situation within the already regulated world of 
work provides an alternative institutional structure through which to 
recognize (and regulate) these relationships without simply relying on 
family or family-like structures. 
So far I have focused on the benefits of legal recognition of intimate 
work. Of course, these benefits would only be achieved with regulation 
                                                 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1963) (setting forth importance of 
trust in business dealings); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. 
REV. 340 (1983) (setting forth theory of relational contracts). 
289. This is the type of disparate impact gender discrimination—disfavoring a trait associated 
with one sex more than another—that Mary Anne Case argued to be troubling, and potentially in 
violation of employment antidiscrimination law, in her seminal article on gendered traits and 
employment discrimination. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 34 
(1995) (describing how the devaluing of the feminine, in men or women, will accrue to the 
disadvantage of women). 
290. See, e.g., Rachel E. Dwyer, The Care Economy? Gender, Economic Restructuring, and Job 
Polarization in the U.S. Labor Market, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 390, 392 (2013); England, supra note 
165, at 383. 
291. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 72. 
292. See ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND 78–108 (2011); Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 226–33. 
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that was sensitive to these goals, a challenge taken up in the next Part. 
Before doing so, it is important to clear the way of the most significant 
challenges to the reliance on law. 
2. Objections and Responses 
Some might object that injecting law here would interfere with liberty 
or otherwise undermine the freedom that beneficially distinguishes 
intimate work relationships from those of the family. As an initial 
matter, objecting to the injection of law here is a bit of a red herring. As 
Part II revealed, some intimate work relationships are already highly 
regulated. 
More fundamentally, contrary to the concerns of libertarians, the law 
proposed here should make intimate workers and consumers more free in 
their relationships, not less. The primary concern with regulation 
interfering with liberty is the state flexing its coercive muscle vis-à-vis 
private parties in a way that interferes with individual choice.
293
 But in 
the work context, there is another party—the employer—who holds 
significant coercive power over the worker.
294
 The bulk of the argument 
in Part II was meant to reveal how the current law of intimate work 
leaves employers with too much liberty to reign in the freedom of 
workers and consumers to form and maintain meaningful intimate work 
relationships. The aim of a comprehensive field of intimate work law 
would be to constrain employers from undermining the value or 
heightening the vulnerability of intimate workers and consumers. The 
law would impose little in the way of affirmative obligations for workers 
or consumers that run the risk of burden or coercion, but instead would 
leave the parties freer to navigate the intimate work relationship without 
employer interference in the formation and rupture of these bonds. 
Employers properly bear this burden because they promote and 
benefit from intimate work. For work that requires intimacy, such as 
nursing, childcare work, or therapy, the employer relies on and benefits 
from intimacy between the worker and the consumer. Even when 
intimacy is not inherent to the job, employers promote intimate work. 
Management literature advises employers to use intimacy as a tool of 
production that increases employee loyalty without requiring a reciprocal 
                                                 
293. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2700–01 
(2008). 
294. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. 
SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
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commitment of job security from the firm.
295
 
These intimacy strategies are particularly important in the service 
economy. For many service jobs, the quality of interaction between the 
worker and the consumer is part of the service delivered, and intimacy 
often enhances this interaction.
296
 In response, employers sort for the 
intimate type—workers who will bring family values to work and 
develop ties with customers.
297
 Employers also require workers to forge 
bonds with customers and learn intimate details about them so as to 
better meet their needs.
298
 For the service worker, “inhabiting the job 
means, at the very least, pretending to like it, and, at most, actually 
bringing his whole self into the job, liking it, and genuinely caring about 
the people with whom he interacts.”299 In the service economy, 
“emotional availability can no longer be dismissed as women’s work; it 
must be seen as a dominant commodity form under late capitalism.”300 
Placing some of the burden of intimate work on employers does raise 
a key concern. It makes intimate work more costly for employers, 
providing an incentive for employers to avoid or reduce the intimacy of 
work, contrary to current practices. Given the need for and benefits of 
intimacy, as evidenced by its prevalence throughout the market, the lack 
of available substitutes, and the relatively modest burdens imposed by 
the interventions proposed here, an anti-intimacy reaction would be 
unlikely.
301
 
                                                 
295. See Peter Cappelli, Rethinking Employment, 33 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 563 (1995). 
296. See Leidner, supra note 14, at 83.  
297. This can be a crucial signal of the “good type” of intimate worker that the employer desires. 
See Spence, supra note 108, at 356–61. 
298. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 60, at 7, 105 (documenting how flight attendants were 
instructed to imagine that customers were guests in their living room); Wharton, supra note 14, at 
156 (“[E]mployers enforce display rules because they assume that workers’ compliance with them is 
beneficial for the organization.”). In industries as varied as hospitality and healthcare, workers use 
technology “to instantly call-up a range and depth of information on customers to allow them to 
‘make encounters feel more personal.’” Marek Korczynski, Understanding Contradictions Within 
the Lived Experience of Service Workers: The Customer-Oriented Bureaucracy, in SERVICE WORK: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 93, at 73, 82; see also Crain, supra note 246, at 1183 n.5. 
299. Cameron Lynne Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, The Service Society and the Changing 
Experience of Work, in WORKING IN THE SERVICE SOCIETY 1, 4 (Cameron Lynne Macdonald & 
Carmen Sirianni eds., 1996). 
300. Paul Myerscough, Short Cuts, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Jan. 3, 2013, at 25; see also Noah, 
supra note 11. 
301. See ZELIZER, supra note 62, at 250–55 (documenting the extensive findings of natural 
intimacy across many different types of work over time). 
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3. The Inadequacy of Private Ordering 
Beyond the benefits of law, intimate workers and consumers need law 
because intimacy undermines the ability to maximize welfare through 
private ordering. Law is a backstop for protecting workers when exit and 
voice and other market mechanisms fall short.
302
 Lopsided bargaining 
power that tends to favor employers often limits workers’ ability to 
utilize exit and voice. But because of what transpires when intimacy 
meets work, intimate workers’ ability to rely on exit and voice to protect 
the value and remedy the vulnerability of intimate work is reduced. 
Moreover, market failures in the context of intimate work render private 
bargaining inefficient. This means that intimate workers cannot reliably 
lean on self-help and need a law of intimate work. 
a. Exit and Voice 
Exit is the ability of the worker to end the employment relationship 
(which employees generally can under employment-at-will). Exit and its 
threat confer leverage on the worker.
303
 Voice is the ability of workers to 
request desired terms and conditions of work from their employers.
304
 
Workers rely on voice through informal requests and other mechanisms 
of feedback, as well as a few legal protections that rely on voice.
305
 
Many workers are already limited in the effective use of exit and voice 
as protective mechanisms because dependence on their jobs renders 
them unwilling or unable to (credibly) threaten exit or to exercise 
voice.
306
 
However effective exit and voice are in the context of work, there is 
reason to believe that they are even less effective in the context of 
intimate work. When it comes to exit, research consistently finds that 
close bonds at work reduce turnover.
307
 If employers need not worry so 
                                                 
302. I rely on the exit/voice framework from the seminal work on group behavior, ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND STATES 1–5 (1970). Under this framework, members of an organization have two responses to 
dissatisfaction with the organization—exit or voice—with loyalty to the organization mediating the 
choice between the two. Id. 
303. See Richard Freeman, The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, 
Quits, and Separations, 94 Q.J. ECON. 643, 643 (1980).  
304. See James R. Detert & Amy C. Edmonson, Implicit Voice Theories: Taken-for-Granted 
Rules of Self-Censorship at Work, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 461, 461 (2011). 
305. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2014) (providing for an “interactive process” by which 
disabled employees seek accommodations from employers). 
306. See Hale, supra note 294, at 472–73. 
307. See Terence R. Mitchell, Why People Stay: Using Job Embeddedness to Predict Voluntary 
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much about intimate workers exiting for better conditions or pay, this 
places less pressure on employers to better conditions or pay. This may 
help to explain why care workers—a large subset of intimate workers—
systematically suffer a wage penalty.
308
 
Intimate-worker voice is also muted by the combination of intimacy 
and work. Intimate workers can become what one economist terms 
“prisoners of love” due to their tendency to sacrifice for the benefit of 
their consumers.
309
 Intimate workers may find themselves in 
circumstances where their attachments to consumers make them less 
likely to withhold services, demand higher wages, or otherwise seek 
better terms of work if this would risk adverse effects on their 
consumers.
310
 So while intimate work may sometimes lead intimate 
workers to stand up to employers on behalf of their consumers,
311
 it may 
also lead intimate workers to reduce voice about their own working 
conditions. Just as a parent’s intimate relationship with her children can 
hamper her ability to make credible threats about reducing care for or 
abandoning her children, so too does an intimate worker’s intimate 
relationship with her consumer hamper her ability to make credible 
threats about reducing care for or abandoning her consumer.
312
 The felt 
obligations of intimacy may lead workers to simply take their lumps 
rather than complain.
313
 
b. Market Failures 
Multiple barriers to efficient bargaining justify legal intervention in 
the context of intimate work.
314
 Contractual arrangements are unlikely to 
provide meaningful protection against lost intimate work relationships. 
Any personal services contracts (i.e., a contract that an intimate worker 
would stay with an employer) could not be specifically enforced,
315
 and 
money damages are not an adequate substitute for lost ties. 
                                                 
Turnover, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1102, 1105 (2001); Moynihan & Pandey, supra note 228, at 211–14.  
308. See England, supra note 165, at 383 (collecting studies finding the pay penalty even after 
controlling for education, skill, working conditions, and even sex composition). 
309. Id. at 390.  
310. Id. 
311. See supra Part II.C.2.  
312. England, supra note 165, at 390.  
313. See Marks, supra note 48, at 855; Massengill, supra note 59, at 203. 
314. See Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1349, 
1352–57 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
315. See Clayton P. Gillette, Tacit Agreement and Relationship-Specific Investment, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 128, 147 (2013). 
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More problematic than any barriers to enforcement is that these 
contracts are unlikely to form in the first place. Workers are myopic and 
overly optimistic about the terms of the employment relationship and 
their legal protections against termination, making them unlikely to 
foresee the need to bargain with either work intimates or their employer 
for terms that are more protective of intimate ties.
316
 Moreover, many 
workers are in too weak a bargaining position to negotiate successfully 
for these terms from their employer.
317
 
Information deficits may also lead to inadequate bargaining at the 
formation of the employment relationship. Because it is the act of 
engaging in intimate work over time that can shift workers’ preferences, 
intimate workers may be unlikely to foresee the impact of intimacy at the 
start of the employment relationship. The behaviors of intimate work are 
at least partially endogenous to doing intimate work. Rather than 
workers with preferences for intimate behaviors seeking out intimate 
work, workers develop intimate behaviors by doing intimate work and 
developing bonds with their consumers. “[C]hild care workers become 
attached to the toddlers they see every day, nurses empathize with their 
patients, and teachers worry about their students.”318 So just as workers 
in jobs involving intellectual skills get smarter, workers in jobs involving 
intimate skills get more intimate—they behave more intimately toward 
those who receive their services.
319
 
Even if some bargains could be struck, say, between an employer and 
an employee, the consequences for consumers will not be adequately 
accounted for in such bargains.
320
 Intimate work calls into question 
standard economic assumptions about externalities—i.e., that rational 
actors will only contract in their own interest. The problem here, though, 
is that these contracts are typically bargained for at the outset of the 
                                                 
316. See Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of 
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (empirically finding 
that “workers appear to systematically overestimate the protections afforded by law, believing that 
they have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact have under an at-
will contract”). 
317. The prevalence of non-compete agreements, which we might think of as non-portability-of-
intimate-capital contracts, could be seen as evidence of this. See sources cited supra notes 244–45. 
318. See England, supra note 165, at 390. 
319. Id.  
320. Cf. Andrew Clark et al., Boon or Bane? Others’ Unemployment Well-Being and Job 
Insecurity, 17 LABOUR ECON. 52, 53–54 (2010) (finding that aggregate unemployment based on the 
strength of the regional labor market is a better predictor of a worker’s well-being than the current 
employment status of that worker); Priti Pradhan Shah, Network Destruction: The Structural 
Implications of Downsizing, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 101, 102 (2000) (finding that dismissal of a friend 
is negatively related to a survivor’s centrality in a firm’s friendship and advice networks).  
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relationship, and at this point intimate workers are suffering from the 
information deficits and myopia just described. 
B. What Law 
Once lawmakers move past the conceptual intimacy-work divide, 
putting in place a unified field of intimate work law would not be such a 
heavy lift. In most areas, courts could simply incorporate a functional 
understanding of the impact of intimate work under current doctrines. In 
a few areas, recognizing intimate work would require a more substantial 
response—a change in doctrine or a statutory amendment. These two 
mechanisms for implementing a new law of intimate work—functional 
recognition and additional recognition—are discussed in turn below. 
1. Functional Recognition 
A functional approach to intimate work requires courts to recognize 
that meaningful intimacy arises not only in the family, but also at work, 
and that intimacy in the provision of work services requires protection.
321
 
Three types of functional adjustments would be required. First, the law 
should expand recognition of intimate work in areas where it currently 
recognizes intimate work but does so too narrowly. Second, the law 
should initiate recognition of intimate work in areas where the law fails 
to recognize the implications of intimate work and treats it just like other 
work. Third, the law should reverse recognition of intimate work where 
the law recognizes intimate work but treats it too much like the family 
by subtracting rather than adding protection. These three types of 
changes are discussed in turn below, followed by a discussion of the 
principles that would guide their application. 
a. Expanding Recognition 
In some instances, the law properly recognizes the value and 
vulnerability of intimate work, but does so too narrowly, failing to 
recognize its full range.
322
 In these cases, the law should expand its 
                                                 
321. For examples of and justification for a functional approach to recognizing relationships, see, 
for example, Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 
269, 270–72 (1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining 
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483–91 (1990); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family 
Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245, 279–80 (1990). 
322. See supra Parts II.C.2 (retaliation); II.D.1 (fiduciary duties); II.E (non-compete agreements). 
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recognition of intimate work. 
Take the law of non-compete agreements, which strictly scrutinizes 
such agreements involving doctors and lawyers to avoid lost intimate 
work investments, but takes a far more lax approach toward other 
intimate workers, despite the same value and vulnerability at stake.
323
 
Here, the law could recognize intimate work by applying heightened 
scrutiny to non-compete agreements across the whole category of 
intimate work. This does not mean that non-compete agreements entered 
into by intimate workers would never be enforceable. Rather, the 
enforcement of these agreements is already subject to a balancing test 
that takes into account the hardship to the worker, the injury to the 
public, and the employer’s need to protect its legitimate interest.324 
Recognizing intimate work would require courts to include the lost value 
of intimate work relationships as a hardship to the worker and an injury 
to the public for intimate workers beyond lawyers and doctors. This 
would still be balanced against the employer’s legitimate interest, and 
the latter might still trump. The balancing would of course depend on the 
evidence presented in any particular case. While balancing such 
incommensurate interests is undoubtedly a difficult undertaking, current 
law already requires decision-makers to weigh incommensurate 
interests—the interests of the worker, the public, and the employer.325 
This revision would simply expand the universe of interests that must be 
weighed in the mix. The law might also consider allowing consumers 
who are affected by the enforcement of the agreement to intervene in the 
suit. 
Likewise, a functional approach to fiduciary duties could better 
recognize intimate work. Currently, fiduciary recognition may be denied 
if a relationship is viewed too much along the lines of a friendship 
without sufficient dominance by one party over the other.
326
 Courts 
                                                 
323. See supra Part II.E.1. 
324. See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539–40 (Wyo. 1993); A.E.P. 
Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760 (N.C. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 188 (1981). 
325. See, e.g., Hopper, 861 P.2d at 540, 543–44 (in ruling on the enforceability of a non-compete 
agreement, considering the interests of the employer (e.g., “the risk of the covenantee losing 
customers” (quoting Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982))), the 
interests of the employee (e.g., “the necessity of the covenantor changing his calling or residence” 
(quoting id.)), and the interests of the public (e.g., whether the “public will . . . suffer injury from 
enforcement of the covenant”)). On legal decisionmaking in the context of incommensurable values 
more generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779 (1994).  
326. See supra Part II.D.1. 
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should more broadly recognize, as some already have, that friendship 
and the intimacy that accompanies it can co-exist with a work 
relationship.
327
 The combination of intimacy and work render intimate 
work relationships prime candidates for the application of fiduciary 
duties. Relating in the realm of work means that intimate workers and 
consumers often deal with pecuniary matters that can result in legally 
cognizable injuries, and the intimacy of the relationship can heighten the 
need for protection based on increased dependence and trust. This is easy 
to see for duties running from the intimate worker to the consumer, but 
the same can be true in reverse.
328
 Courts should also recognize that 
these relationships can generate fiduciary duties running from consumers 
to intimate workers. 
While the application of fiduciary duties in the intimate work context 
in factually appropriate circumstances may seem like a significant shift, 
it is simply an application of a principle that is already applied in 
multiple jurisdictions: when there is sufficient trust and dependence 
between the parties, even without a dominant and subordinate party, 
fiduciary duties should attach to protect the vulnerability that can arise 
out of the misuse of information.
329
 Jurisdictions that have already 
adopted such a principle, both in the context of intimate work and 
outside of it, have not been overburdened by this broader understanding 
of fiduciary duty.
330
 
For other laws, recognizing the whole category of intimate work 
requires grounding in a theory that better reflects the way that intimate 
work changes the behavior of intimate workers. For example, recall that 
collective action rights under the NLRA protect intimate workers who 
complain of bad treatment of their consumers only when courts are 
willing to read such complaints as motivated by intimate workers’ self-
interested economic gain.
331
 Work law instead should recognize that 
because intimate workers come to care about their consumers, actions 
taken to improve consumers’ welfare also improve intimate workers’ 
welfare. Therefore, intimate workers who exercise voice to improve 
conditions for their consumers typically satisfy the mutuality 
requirement for protection. 
                                                 
327. See Leib, supra note 205, at 707–09 (collecting cases). 
328. See supra Part II.D.1.  
329. See Frankel, supra note 197, at 809–10. 
330. See supra notes 205–10; Lieb, supra note 197, at 702–07. 
331. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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b. Initial Recognition 
In other instances, work law fails to recognize intimate work at all and 
treats it just like all other work. In such cases, current doctrine could be 
modified to appreciate the role of intimate work in intimate worker and 
consumer behavior. For example, Title VII’s protection against 
retaliation “prohibits any employer action that well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a 
[discrimination] charge.”332 Recognizing intimate work in this context 
would mean recognizing that among employer actions that would 
dissuade a reasonable intimate worker from making or supporting a 
discrimination charge would be retaliation against the intimate worker’s 
consumers. Recall the earlier example of an employer who retaliates 
against a camp counselor by worsening conditions for her campers. 
This type of recognition would require courts to adopt a more fluid 
understanding of intimacy and work instead of relying on existing legal 
categories of workers and intimates.
333
 Recall the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Thompson holding that an employer’s action against a 
worker’s fiancé could fall within the scope of prohibited employer 
action.
334
 Recognizing intimate work would mean extending protection 
to acts against work intimates and not just family or family-like 
intimates. 
Thompson does hold promise as a model for the functional 
recognition of intimate work not artificially limited by the legal 
categories of work and family that could be extended to other areas of 
work law. The Court suggested that retaliation protection would turn on 
a fact-specific inquiry into the intimacy at stake in a particular case.
335
 
While it continued to privilege family relationships,
336
 it “decline[d] to 
identify a fixed class of relationships for which third-party reprisals are 
unlawful,” leaving open the possibility that adverse action taken against 
a “close friend” could constitute actionable harassment.337 Indeed, the 
                                                 
332. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
333. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing role of legal categories and in presumptions about behavior 
in retaliation cases).  
334. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 174. 
335. See id. at 174–75. 
336. Id. at 175 (“We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the 
Burlington standard . . . .”). 
337. Id. at 174–75 (in response to a concern about extending protection to a “close friend,” stating 
that “inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we 
are reluctant to generalize” because “[g]iven the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace 
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touchstone for relief was one based on a functional understanding of 
how intimacy can affect work behavior: whether the allegedly retaliatory 
action was the type that would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from engaging in protected activity.”338 
Recognizing intimate work in the context of unlawful terminations 
and transfers requires work law to appreciate how relationships with 
consumers fundamentally determine the terms and conditions of work 
for intimate workers.
339
 In the case of remedying unlawful terminations, 
for example, appreciating the significance of intimate work relationships 
for personal and professional support for intimate workers should lead 
courts to consider whether reinstatement is necessary to make the worker 
whole. The significance of intimate work bonds would not mandate 
reinstatement, but would be weighed in the balance in considering the 
appropriate remedy. For example, evidence that a terminated employee 
was so embittered by the litigation process that she could not return as an 
effective employee would weigh against reinstatement. If reinstatement 
is not ordered, lost investments in intimate work relationships should be 
valued and awarded to the intimate worker as damages.
340
 
Other times, initiating recognition of intimate work requires revision 
of the assumptions underlying a doctrine. This is so, for example, with 
the duty of loyalty and trade secret protection.
341
 Both doctrines fail to 
protect intimate workers and consumers on the assumption that 
consumers are more bonded to businesses that offer services than to the 
intimate workers who serve them.
342
 In cases of intimate work, courts 
should consider evidence that the consumer’s relationship with the firm 
may be driven more by bonds with the intimate worker than by the 
employer’s efforts. Again, intimate workers would not always prevail, 
but this evidence should be considered and weighed in the worker’s 
favor. 
In cases involving a duty of loyalty violation, work law should grant 
intimate workers more leeway to plan their career trajectories without 
fear of litigation. Courts should move away from assuming that any 
contact between the intimate worker and consumer amounts to 
                                                 
contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible 
to a comprehensive set of clear rules”).  
338. Id. at 174. 
339. See supra Part I.B. 
340. How such losses should be valued is addressed shortly. See infra notes 389–90 and 
accompanying text. 
341. See supra Parts II.E.2 and II.E.3. 
342. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text. 
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solicitation.
343
 Rather, courts should engage in a more fact-sensitive 
inquiry as to whether such contact was soliciting business or was simply 
an attempt to continue the intimate side of the relationship. 
In trade secret litigation, courts should take into account the relative 
role of intimate worker efforts as compared with employer efforts in 
assessing whether customer identity is subject to trade secret protection. 
Current law assumes that sufficient employer efforts mean that customer 
identity is not readily ascertainable to competitors, and this leads to 
employer ownership of the customer identity as a trade secret.
344
 Instead, 
courts should also consider evidence that relationships between 
customers and particular intimate workers were integral to developing or 
maintaining a customer base. This evidence, although not determinative, 
should factor against the finding of a trade secret violation, as it cuts 
against employer ownership of the customer relationship, and gives the 
intimate worker a greater ownership stake. Any unfairness to the 
employer is reduced by the employer’s ability to maintain customer 
identity as a trade secret by taking steps to strengthen customers’ bonds 
with the firm as opposed to their bonds with particular intimate workers, 
by, for example, rotating which workers serve the same customer. 
c. Reversing Recognition 
In still other areas of work law, recognizing intimate work requires 
reversing current law’s treatment of intimate work as too much like 
family intimacy. In such cases, current law’s subtraction of protection 
for intimate work requires instead an addition of protection to ensure that 
workers and consumers can enjoy the value of intimate work without 
excessive vulnerability. 
For example, in response to intimate workers’ tendency to sacrifice 
for consumers by doing additional work for them, the FLSA currently 
removes wage and hour protection when workers act out of love and 
devotion.
345
 To recognize intimate work and provide adequate protection 
here does not require a new test for the meaning of work. Rather, it 
requires an understanding that simply because work is done out of love 
and devotion for a consumer does not mean that it is not work that is also 
                                                 
343. See supra Part II.E.2. 
344. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.  
345. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing how even intimate workers covered 
under the FLSA may be denied payment for portions of their work that are seen to be done out of 
love). 
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done “primarily for the benefit of the employer.”346 Workers can work 
out of multiple motivations. Just as such mixed motives do not take non-
intimate work outside the realm of work when one motive is to benefit 
the employer, so too should such mixed motives not render intimate 
work outside the FLSA’s protection. Work that provides some benefit to 
the worker based on her devotion to her consumer does not mean that the 
primary benefit of the work does not go to the employer.
347
 Juries should 
be so instructed in such cases when deciding where to draw the line 
between work and non-work, with an emphasis on weighing the relative 
benefit to employer or employee of the contested intimate work tasks. 
This would allow for case-by-case line-drawing between paid work and 
non-paid intimacy rather than a categorical rejection of work that is 
motivated out of love. 
d. Principles 
One of the first considerations with separating out a subset of 
workers—intimate workers—who are treated differently under work law 
is how to identify the subset of workers who merit this treatment. As 
discussed at the outset of the Article, the distinction between intimate 
work and other work is not so much binary as a question of degree.
348
 
The law’s project would be identifying when work was sufficiently 
intimate to warrant distinct treatment. Line-drawing along a continuous 
rather than discrete input is endemic to law. Simply because line-
drawing is difficult does not mean it is not a project worth 
undertaking.
349
 
Courts should engage in a context-dependent inquiry to assess 
whether a worker qualifies for recognition as an intimate worker. Indeed, 
this is precisely what the Supreme Court suggested, at least in theory, 
when it recognized that an employer’s action against a “close friend” 
could constitute an act of retaliation worthy of protection under Title VII 
if the facts so warranted (i.e., that the act in retaliation against the “close 
friend” would have dissuaded the employee from complaining in light of 
                                                 
346. Holzapfel v. Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 528 (2d Cir. 1998). 
347. For example, simply because a nurse gains satisfaction from forgoing her lunch break to 
provide additional care and support to one of her patients does not negate the fact that the primary 
benefit of her work accrues to the employer.  
348. See supra Part I.A. 
349. For attempts to get purchase on various aspects of the line-drawing problem, see, for 
example, Bradley T. Borden, Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 971 (2013); David A. Weisbach, Line-Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999).  
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the relationship).
350
 And courts have likewise been able to draw such 
lines when assessing fiduciary obligations that are based on the facts of 
particular relationships.
351
 The burden would be on the employee to 
assert and prove her interest as an intimate worker, although some 
intimate workers might categorically be recognized as intimate, at least 
for certain purposes, as doctors and lawyers are for non-compete 
agreements. 
This proof structure is important because of the heterogeneity in how 
intimate workers and consumers treat their relationships across different 
types of intimate work and even within a particular type of intimate 
work. In light of professional training, licensing, and ethics, we might be 
willing to make certain presumptions about the doctor-patient 
relationship that we are not willing to make about the hairstylist-
customer relationship. But the latter should still support a case for 
recognition if it can be proven to warrant it. This variation means that 
not all intimate workers need to be treated the same, either across the 
category of intimate work, or within a particular type of intimate work. 
That is, the law of intimate work might not treat all hairstylists the same 
for all purposes, as some develop quite intimate relationships with 
consumers, and others do not. Functional recognition of intimate work 
thus requires that categorical rules about intimacy and work do not bar 
intimate work relationships from protection when the facts merit it. 
Beyond this, decisionmakers must engage in a fact-sensitive inquiry to 
assess whether protection is warranted. 
As for assigning value to ruptured intimate work bonds, money is a 
poor substitute for the loss suffered, particularly when the loss is 
relational.
352
 But it is usually the best we can do, as we can see in many 
areas where the law awards damages for non-pecuniary losses. This area 
of intimate work could then borrow from other areas of law, such as the 
cause of action for loss of consortium, that engage in the difficult 
problem of how to monetize the loss of relational value, both in quantity 
and quality.
353
 The continuous rather than discrete nature of money 
damages is consistent with, and indeed helps to recognize, the fact that 
intimate work exists along a spectrum of intimacy. Money damages can 
                                                 
350. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011). 
351. See supra Part II.C.1. 
352. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights; The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights 
in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 317 (2010). 
353. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1710 (2007) 
(“[J]uries do assign values to even the most inchoate injuries, such as emotional distress and loss of 
consortium.”).  
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be calibrated to reflect the level of intimacy of the work relationship, 
which will typically bear a substantial relationship to the significance of 
the loss. 
Critics may object that monetizing the value of intimate work 
commodifies it and lessens its value by crowding out the intrinsic 
motivations of intimacy—altruism and love—that make intimate work 
so valuable.
354
 When subjects are asked to do a task that offers some 
intrinsic interests for many people, they are often less willing to perform 
the task when they are offered an extrinsic reward.
355
 Extrinsic rewards 
may, under certain circumstances, thus crowd out intrinsic 
motivations.
356
 This might suggest that compensating more of intimate 
work (and monetizing the value of lost intimate work relationships) 
would lessen intrinsic motivations for intimate work.
357
 
A deeper dive into the research indicates that the concern about 
crowding out is unwarranted because it is unlikely to arise, or at least is 
avoidable, in the circumstances of intimate work. First, crowding out is 
more likely to occur when work is entirely unpaid, and the extrinsic 
reward leads the efforts to cross over the unpaid-paid divide.
358
 Intimate 
workers, by definition, are already paid for some of their work. Second, 
crowding out occurs when the extrinsic rewards are viewed as 
“controlling”—those coupled with close supervision or judgments by 
supervisors that may call the worker’s competence into question.359 But 
extrinsic rewards that are viewed as “acknowledging”—those that 
convey that pay is combined with trust, respect, and appreciation—do 
not have such an effect.
360
 So long as compensation for intimate work is 
provided in an acknowledging rather than a controlling fashion, there is 
little reason to be concerned about crowding out. 
2. Additional Recognition 
Much of the protection required to remedy the vulnerability of 
intimate work can be achieved simply by taking a more functional 
                                                 
354. England, supra note 165, at 394 (defining intrinsic motivation as “willingness to expend 
effort on a task without extrinsic reward”). 
355. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589 
(2001). 
356. See id. 
357. England, supra note 165, at 394.  
358. Id. 
359. Id. at 395.  
360. Id.  
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approach to intimate work under current work law. But the full measure 
of protection required for intimate workers and their consumers can only 
be achieved by the more robust approach of adding law that would 
protect against the promotion of discriminatory intimate work 
preferences, the sacrifices taken by intimate workers, the exposure of 
intimate workers, and the lost value of intimate work relationships. 
These are discussed in turn below. 
a. Discrimination 
Recognizing the role that the employer plays in the relationship 
between intimate worker and consumer and recent changes in intimacy 
law that undermine this field of intimate work law, I join other scholars 
in advocating for the elimination of the BFOQ, at least in the context of 
same-sex preferences on the basis of privacy.
361
 But I do not focus on 
this doctrinal change here, as the exception encompasses only a small 
subset of body workers.
362
 Rather, my emphasis is on placing more 
responsibility on employers to avoid promoting discriminatory 
preferences in the intimate work relationship. 
A first proposal would prohibit employers from fulfilling express 
requests by consumers for intimate workers of a particular protected 
trait. Current law already bans employers from “classify[ing]” 
employees on the basis of a protected trait, so long as the employee can 
show that it “deprive[s] or tend[s] to deprive [him] of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect[s] his status as an 
employee”363 Fulfilling express protected-identity-based requests 
undoubtedly requires employers to “classify” employees. The challenge 
is that such “classif[ication]” may lead to negative employment 
consequences down the line that are traceable to the classification but are 
                                                 
361. See Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An 
Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985) 
(arguing for the demise of the BFOQ based in customer privacy concerns because it contradicts the 
goal of Title VII to promote equal employment opportunity and change the status quo with regard to 
identity-based exclusions from employment); Kapczynski, supra note 123, at 1261–62 (arguing for 
the demise of the BFOQ based in customer privacy concerns because such concerns cannot be 
meaningfully distinguished from other customer preferences that the law does not tolerate).  
362. See Yuracko, supra note 9, at 155–57 (discussing the range of cases in which the privacy-
based BFOQ has been applied). 
363. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.” (emphases added)). 
07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
1238 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1167 
 
nonetheless difficult to prove as such. Even though the fulfillment of 
such requests may not be neatly linked to a particular adverse 
employment action against an employee, this practice perpetuates and 
reinforces customer preferences. The change proposed here would make 
fulfilling such requests unlawful, even when the employee has difficulty 
drawing a connection to a specific adverse consequence.
364
 
One could imagine extending this proposal to a duty on the part of the 
employer not to act on more subtle discriminatory preferences (e.g., to 
ensure that a request to avoid a particular nurse is not race-based). Such 
an affirmative duty that essentially amounts to a negligence-like standard 
would be out of place in an employment discrimination law largely 
focused on discriminatory intent.
365
 In the context of sexual harassment, 
scholars have acknowledged how employers’ obligations to address 
third-party harassment looks far more like a negligence standard than 
one based on discriminatory intent.
366
 However, this obligation applies 
only when “the employer had actual or constructive notice of both the 
harassment and its basis in race or sex.”367 By analogy, liability in the 
context of employers acting on discriminatory consumer preferences 
would require the same type of notice on the part of the employer, which 
would typically be unavailable. Employers are far less likely to be on 
notice of subtle discriminatory preferences, which are based in the 
consumer’s state of mind, as compared with the overt acts that make up 
harassing conduct.
368
 Further combatting discriminatory consumer 
preferences thus requires resort to other mechanisms. 
Employers should be held responsible for the affirmative acts they 
take that cultivate and reinforce discriminatory preferences. Such acts 
include employers advertising their intimate workers on the basis of 
membership in a protected class (e.g., a gynecology practice advertising 
                                                 
364. This type of per se rule may be more properly enforced by the EEOC rather than through a 
private suit by an employee, as there would be a question about identifying the injured employee 
with standing to sue. Of course, a broad notion of injury could recognize that mere classification by 
a protected identity trait, even without a concrete material harm, reinforces stereotyping and stigma 
in a way that harms any employees subject to the classification. 
365. See Noah A. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the 
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2009) (setting forth the 
few negligence-like elements in the largely intent-based employment antidiscrimination law). 
366. Id. at 1359–61 (explaining how employers have an obligation to prevent intentional 
discrimination by third parties, including customers, in the context of sexual harassment, even when 
the employers themselves harbor no discriminatory intent).  
367. Id. at 1403 (collecting cases). 
368. Cf. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal 
Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315, 1361–62 (2008) (describing the “identifiable” and tort-like 
conduct of sexual harassment as compared with other employment discrimination claims). 
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all women doctors and nurses);
369
 otherwise making salient to consumers 
an intimate worker’s membership in a protected class (e.g., a spa asking 
customers for sex preference for a massage therapist); or suggesting 
membership in a protected class as a basis for disfavored consumer and 
intimate worker treatment (e.g., a statement on a wedding 
photographer’s website that the firm opposes same-sex marriage).370 
Several mechanisms could lead employers to take responsibility for 
such acts. Antidiscrimination law could ban these acts, or could apply a 
rebuttable presumption of discrimination to employers who engage in 
these acts, even if intimate workers who want to challenge them cannot 
draw a direct link between these acts and an adverse employment action. 
These proposals might raise First Amendment concerns, although similar 
concerns have been put aside in the name of equality.
371
 Another avenue 
to pursue is simply to rely on current law, under which such acts already 
serve as evidence of discrimination when an intimate worker experiences 
an adverse employment action, such as a failure to hire.
372
 But 
enforcement problems in raising and proving hiring discrimination 
claims keep the existing law banning hiring discrimination from being an 
effective mechanism.
373
 
One response then is to rely on the EEOC rather than private plaintiffs 
to bring these lawsuits. The EEOC already has such authority and would 
                                                 
369. If the firm only employs workers from this protected class (e.g., a gynecology practice with 
only female doctors and nurses), such advertising would not even require the employer to engage in 
unlawful classification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012); see also supra note 362 and 
accompanying text. 
370. See supra Part II.B.1. 
371. For example, an employer may not post a sign that reads “White Only,” despite the fact that 
this is a restriction on speech. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 13 (1993). The 
interaction of antidiscrimination law, particularly sexual harassment, and the First Amendment, has 
spawned a large literature. For an introduction, see, for example, id.; Deborah Epstein, Can a 
“Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile 
Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399 (1996); Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Speech in 
the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That 
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace 
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). 
372. See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES CONCERNING A JOB 
APPLICANT’S RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN (1982), available at 
http://uwf.edu/svodanov/legal/EEOC-AB-inquires.pdf (“[I]nquiries which tend directly or indirectly 
to disclose [information about an applicant’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin] . . . . may, 
unless otherwise explained, constitute evidence of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.”). Under 
some state laws, the inquiries themselves are prohibited. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 49.60.180(4) (2014); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-12-140 (2015).  
373. See Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 140. 
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simply need to make combatting intimate work discrimination an 
enforcement priority.
374
 Of course, the EEOC’s resources are limited, 
and expending more resources on hiring discrimination would mean 
expending fewer resources on other priorities. Scholars have critiqued 
the shift in focus of Title VII litigation from removing identity-based 
barriers to employment to protecting those already employed.
375
 This 
scholarship would likewise support prioritizing hiring discrimination at 
the EEOC, and, in particular, employer practices that tend to exclude 
workers from a field of work on the basis of a protected identity trait, as 
we have seen in the context of intimate work. 
While these proposals limit consumers from exercising discriminatory 
preferences, this should not be considered a flaw. When consumers’ 
preferences would clearly result in an adverse employment action, the 
law does not consider the failure to satisfy these preferences a 
cognizable harm to either the consumer or the employer.
376
 It should be 
no different when the connection to an adverse employment action is 
less clear. Moreover, in the longer run, challenging intimate biases can 
benefit not only workers and society, but those with biases themselves, 
who are no longer artificially restricted in their ability to connect with 
the full range of intimate workers. 
To the extent critics would be concerned that a consumer might 
forego important medical or other services rather than interact with an 
intimate worker of an undesired identity, these proposals maintain space 
for a consumer with fixed preferences to exercise them. It will simply 
take more work for her to do so: She will need to do some additional 
investigation into the identity of a particular intimate worker before 
engaging her services, or she will have to couch a request for a particular 
intimate worker in nondiscriminatory terms. The changes proposed 
above thus allow antidiscrimination law to aim toward reducing 
customer biases while nonetheless recognizing the reality of intransigent 
preferences in the short and even long term. 
                                                 
374. It has already done so on occasion. See, e.g., EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. 
Mo. 1996) (successfully challenging female-only hiring policy for weight-loss counselors); EEOC 
v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (successfully challenging female-only hiring policy for 
employees at women’s health club).  
375. See John Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991); Michael Selmi, Public v. Private 
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1458 
(1998).  
376. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a company that 
restricted the job of international marketing director to men based on customer preference had 
engaged in unlawful discrimination). 
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b. Sacrifice 
To protect intimate workers fully, the FLSA should be amended to 
extend to intimate work that is currently exempt from its reach on the 
basis of intimacy. The recent reforms that would expand wage and hour 
protections for home healthcare workers still exempt certain intimate 
work—“fellowship” and “protection.”377 The law could require payment 
for all of this intimate work, as even fellowship and protection can be 
considered work, even if it is also intimate. While some have expressed 
concerns about the burden of costs to the consumers (or whoever pays) 
in this line of work,
378
 it is difficult to see why any group of workers 
should not be guaranteed the same basic protections as other workers 
based on cost concerns, which can be addressed through other means.
379
 
c. Exposure 
A more generous application of fiduciary duties in intimate work 
relationships where confidences are shared can serve to protect intimate 
workers and consumers against certain forms of exposure. But it still 
leaves intimate workers open to hostile or demeaning treatment by 
consumers.
380
 To protect against this type of exposure, intimate workers 
could be provided a right to ask, meaning “a right to ask for [particular] 
working conditions” as a way to avoid harmful exposure that can be a 
part of intimate work.
381
 For example, a right to ask would allow 
intimate workers to seek reprieve from working with an abusive 
consumer. 
In the United Kingdom, workers have such a right to request 
accommodations in the form of modified work hours or work location to 
care for a child.
382
 The law does not require that the employer provide an 
                                                 
377. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2014).  
378. See Press Release, Rep. John Kline & Rep. Tim Wahlberg, Kline, Walberg Statement on 
DOL Companion Care Regulation (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://walberg.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=349958 (“Today’s regulatory 
action by the Department of Labor will raise costs and limit access to in-home care for vulnerable 
Americans.”); Steven Greenhouse, U.S. to Include Home Health Aides in Wage and Overtime Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at B1 (quoting industry officials raising concerns about costs). 
379. For example, the government could subsidize consumers upon proof of need or give a tax 
credit.  
380. This is far less true for consumers, who typically have more market power to exit than 
intimate workers who need their jobs. 
381. See Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 141–44, for a discussion of employing the right to ask 
in a different context. 
382. See Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80F (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act 
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accommodation, but instead requires that the employer consider requests 
for accommodation and provide a process for considering such 
requests.
383
 Scholars have commented on how a procedural guarantee 
like the one offered under U.K. law frequently results in an employer 
accommodating the request.
384
 “By establishing an institutionalized 
forum for employers and workers to discuss potential workplace 
changes,” right-to-ask laws can “provide[] a means for employers to 
discover that there often are no significant financial, administrative, or 
practical downsides to modifying workplace practices as workers 
desire.”385 
A right to ask (along with protection from retaliation for exercising 
the right) could buttress intimate worker voice. Providing a formal legal 
mechanism rather than requiring the worker to strike out on her own not 
only lowers the cost of making requests, but legitimates the requests.
386
 
Right-to-ask laws can also create a focal point for both employers and 
employees to bargain around subjects that are otherwise quite difficult to 
bargain around.
387
 Moreover, an intimate worker’s request for changed 
conditions sends a credible signal of the worker’s unhappiness and her 
possibility of exit.
388
 And a right to ask would largely be self-regulating. 
As most workers do not want to be perceived as “problems,” they will 
tend to ask for an accommodation of this sort only when it is really 
needed. 
                                                 
2002). 
383. See id.; Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in 
the United States and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2012); Katherine Van Wezel Stone et 
al., Employment Protection for Atypical Workers: Proceedings of the 2006 Annual Meeting, 
Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 10 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 233, 266–68 (2006). Regulations that implement the U.K. law require that 
some form of discourse take place: “the holding of a meeting between the employer and the 
employee to discuss an application . . . within twenty-eight days after the date the application is 
made.” Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(a). 
384. See Van Wezel Stone et al., supra note 383, at 268. 
385. Id. 
386. See Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and 
Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1722–23 (2006) 
(discussing the legitimating effects of a behavior when it is legalized). 
387. For a discussion of the role of focal points in addressing coordination problems, see 
generally Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000). 
388. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 589 (2008) (“A standard insight of the signaling theory literature in economics 
is that as a general matter, a statement is credible when it is accompanied by a costly action—in 
particular, an action that is more costly for a dishonest speaker to engage in.”); Caryl E. Rusbult et 
al., Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect: An Integrative Model of 
Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 599, 605 (1988). 
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Of course, the right to ask is no panacea. Beyond not guaranteeing 
any substantive outcome, it places the onus of seeking protection on 
intimate workers themselves, albeit while lowering the burden of doing 
so. To lighten the load, the law could switch the default so that the 
employer asks the intimate worker periodically whether she would like 
an accommodation against working with harmful consumers. 
d. Lost Investments 
Unemployment insurance does little to address the lost value of 
ruptured intimate work relationships.
389
 Programs that directly facilitate 
the maintenance or development of intimate ties would be valuable to 
intimate workers. For example, UI offices could provide opportunities 
for the unemployed to network and socialize with prospective 
consumers. In fact, simply providing a space where the unemployed can 
gather and support each other in their job searches will almost inevitably 
result in connecting prospective intimate workers and consumers. And 
socializing with others who are looking for work could help to fill the 
void of lost intimate work ties.
390
 
CONCLUSION 
The law is premised on categories. Courses and casebooks are built on 
the assumption that the objects of legal regulation can be neatly divided 
by subject matter. This Article highlights how legal categories can 
overlook a social reality that transcends these categories, and documents 
the harms that can flow as a result. It reveals how the law’s categorical 
approach to intimacy and work overlooks the value and vulnerability 
produced by a fundamental part of civil society critical not only to a 
large set of workers, but also to the public who consumes their services. 
This Article calls for a unified law of intimate work that transcends 
standard legal categories. Ultimately, if the law can begin to recognize 
both intimacy and work wherever it arises, legal categories, and the 
harmful barriers they erect, could start to erode. As work law begins to 
encompass intimacy, the legal categories of intimacy and work will 
                                                 
389. See supra Part II.E.4. 
390. One example of such a program is Platform to Employment, which some states have 
administered using federal funds. See Alana Semuels, A Better Way to Help the Long-Term 
Unemployed, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/ 
a-better-way-to-help-the-long-term-unemployed/385298/. This program provides a selected group of 
unemployed with a job-readiness class, among other benefits. Id. One participant was quoted as 
saying that the class “bonded like a family.” Id. 
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become less distinct: work law would also come to be intimacy law, and 
intimacy law would also come to be work law. A less categorical law 
would better reflect and protect the ways that intimacy and work operate 
in our lives. 
 
